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In response to the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Standard
Oil' and a report of the Comptroller General,2 Congress, in 1962, enacted the
Federal Medical Care Recovery Act3 [hereinafter referred to as the Act]. It
provides that the federal government shall have the right to recover from third-
party tortfeasors the cost of medical care furnished, by the government or at gov-
ernment expense, to persons injured as the result of such third-party's negligence."
Initially, this rather obscure legislation would not seem to have any significant
impact upon the practice of most personal injury lawyers. A closer inspection,
however, reveals that it may, in the not too distant future, appreciably affect the
profession. This is especially true since the group of people entitled to medical
treatment at government expense is now quite large and steadily growing.5
As is the case with many federal statutes, the Act was not accompanied
by an immediate impact on the bar. This was primarily because the government
enforcement agencies were inadequately staffed and ineffectively organized.
Also, due to the draftsmanship of the original statute, the nature and extent
of the government's right were left in question. In many cases, the government
was neither aware of nor actively sought to enforce its rights.
During the past four years, the picture has changed radically. The enforce-
ment agencies still remain woefully understaffed, but as a result of experience
* Visiting Associate Professor, University of Oklahoma School of Law. Member of the
Missouri and Illinois Bars. A.B., University of Missouri (1961); J.D., University of Missouri
(1963). While on active duty in the U.S. Army, Professor Long spent three years as a Post
Claims Officer and handled claims arising under the Federal Medical Care Recovery Act. He
is the author of Recovery Beyond the Federal Medical Care Recovery Act, 14 S. DAKOTA L.
REv. 20 (1969).
1 332 U.S. 301 (1947). In this case, a soldier on active duty was injured in an auto-
mobile accident. The United States brought suit against the owner and driver of the truck
which caused the accident to recover the amounts that the Army had expended for hospital-
ization, medical care, and the pay of the soldier during the period of his incapacitation. The
Court held that since Congress had not acted in the area, this indicated a Congressional intent
that there should not be a cause of action for the government, and that until Congress acted,
through statutory enactment, there would be no recovery under federal common law.
2 COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES, REVIEW OF THE GOVERNMENT'S
RIGHTS AND PRACTICES CONCERNING RECOVERY OF THE COST OF HOSPITALIZATION AND
MEDICAL SERVICES IN NEGLIGENT THIRD-PARTY CASES (1960). The Report recommended
that "the Congress enact legislation to provide the Government with the right of action to
recover its costs of furnishing hospital and medical care to injured persons in all negligent
third-party cases." Id. at 16.
3 42 U.S.C. §§ 2651-53 (1966).
4 The money collected under the Act is credited to the medical care account of the
agency furnishing the care. Each year, Congress reduces the medical appropriation for each
agency from the budget submitted to it by an amount estimated to be collected by the agency
under the Act. All administrative costs for collection and enforcement are borne by the
agencies out of their regular appropriations and are not deducted from the amounts recovered.
See 45 OFF THE RECORD 10 (1970).
5 For a comprehensive listing of those eligible for medical treatment at' government
expense, see 10 U.S.C. §§ 1071-87 (Supp. II, 1966); 38 U.S.C. § 610(a) (Supp. I 1966);
42 U.S.C. §§ 249-53(a) (Supp. II, 1966); 42 U.S.C. §§ 2001-5 (1964).
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and a follow-up -study by the Comptroller General, they are now much better
organized and are aggressively seeking to enforce the government's interest.
Likewise, many of the ambiguities in the statute which hampered earlier en-
forcement have been settled by litigation.: As a result of the changes, the ordinary
practitioner can no longer continue to ignore the Act, for to do so will almost
surely result in a great disservice to his client. At the minimum, his client will
be called on to participate in the government's enforcement proceedings; s and
at the maximum, he may find that he is required to return a sizable portion of
any settlement or judgment he has recovered.'
6 Letter Report B-133142, Defense Division, United States General Accounting Office to
the Secretary of Defense, Dec. 2, 1968, on file with the NoTRE DAME LAWYER.
7 The first case involving the Act did not reach the courts until 1965. Since then there
have been roughly twenty-five cases interpreting various portions of the Act. For discussions
of these cases, see: Noone, Federal Medical Care Recovery Act, 55 A.B.A.J. 259 (1969);
Townsend, Some Comments on Federal Medical Recovery Act Decisions, 10 AF JAG L. REv.
44 (1968); Comment, 23 RUTGERS L. REv. 141 (1968).
8 The Attorney General's implementing regulations under the Act provide that one of the
obligations incurred by acceptance of care is the duty to cooperate with the government in the
prosecution of any action that the government might take against the third party. 28 C.F.R.
§ 43.2 (1968).
9 One of the very early cases under the Act, United States v. Ammons, 242 F.Supp. 461
(N.D. Fla. 1965), held that the government could not sue the injured party directly for the
costs of his care unless he had made an assignment on its behalf. The validity of this decision
is open to question, not so much for its interpretation of the Act as for its failure to recognize
that the Act provides two distinct procedures for the government to satisfy its claim. The court
denied recovery from the injured party on the basis that the Act creates an independent statu-
tory right against the third party tortfeasor, not against the injured person. In this respect it
is consistent with the government's position under the Act and with a vast majority of the
other courts which have subsequently considered the question. See, e.g., United States v.
York, 398 F.2d 582 (6th Cir. 1968); United States v. Merrigan, 389 F.2d 21 (3d Cir. 1968).
It follows then, if the right is separate and distinct from that of the injured party, that he
cannot affect the government's right by suit or release. See, e.g., United States v. Winter, 275
F.Supp. 895 (E.D. Pa. 1967); United States v. Greene, 266 F.Supp. 976 (N.D. Ill. 1967).
The tortfeasor that settles with the injured party for his medical expenses, therefore, does so
at his own risk as the government may still sue to collect its claim. Id. Thus, to protect
himself, he should insist that the injured party sign an agreement that he will handle and
settle any claim which the government may subsequently assert. Cf. United States v. Nation,
299 F.Supp. 266 (N.D. Okla. 1969). However, the court failed to realize that the Act also
provides for the enforcement of the right created by means of subrogation as well as by
independent suit. 42 U.S.C. § 2651 (a) (1964). It is elementary that subrogation rights do not
depend upon assignment from the subrogor. Further, in most states it has been clearly estab-
lished that the subrogor may represent any subrogated interests as well as his own without
the subrogee being named as a party plaintiff. See, e.g., Noone, May Plaintiffs Induce the
United States" Claim under the Federal Medical Care Recovery Act Without Government
Intervention? 10 AF JAG L. REv. 20 '(1968). Therefore, when the injured party includes and
collects the expenses of his medical treatment, this money because of the statutory subroga-
tion provision belongs to the United States, and it should be able to sue to force the injured
party to disgorge it. In doing so the government is not asserting a primary claim under the
Act against the injured party, but merely forcing the injured party to surrender a portion
of his judgment, which he is entitled to claim from the tortfeasor in the absence of direct
action by the government, but which he should not be allowed to retain in the face of the
government's superior claim.
As a result, when the injured party has collected for his medical expenses, the govern-
ment should have its choice either to enforce its primary right under the Act against the
tortfeasor or to collect its subrogated interest from the injured party who holds his settlement
or judgment subject to the government's superior claim. The net effect will be the same in
either case, if the tortfeasor has insisted that the injured party furnish an agreement to handle
and settle the government's claim. See United States v. Nation, 299 F. Supp. 266 (N.D.
Okla. 1969). This approach was taken by the Comptroller General in an unpublished opinion
allowing the government to withhold the amount of the government's claim from the injured
party's pay where he had received a settlement or a judgment which purportedly included the
government's claim. CoMP. GEN. DEc. B-15093 (Jan. 26, 1966), on file with the NOTRE
DAME LAWYER.
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In the past, many lawyers whose clients have accepted government medical
treatment and thereby brought the Act into operation have been frustrated
in their efforts to deal with the government by a complete lack of readily available
information concerning the organization of the governmental recovery program
or the policies used in the administration of the Act. It is to help these lawyers
and those who are faced with the Act for the first time that this article is written.
The Act will be discussed from two points of view. The first section will
deal with the official recovery program. It will attempt to provide a guide to
the organization of the various government agencies' and will discuss the gov-
ernment's position on the important questions of waiver and compromise.
Information on these important points is essential to the personal injury at-
torney attempting to secure the best possible recovery for his client. Unfortunately
for the practicing bar, the Act and the implementing regulations promulgated
by the Attorney General"' leave the administrative heads of the enforcement
agencies with wide discretion in the granting of compromises and waivers.
Experience has shown that not all the agencies have exercised this discretion
in the same manner. The various tenable positions on compromise and waiver
will, therefore, be outlined; and some indication will be given as to the position
taken by the individual agencies.
The second portion of the article deals with the unofficial collection pro-
cedure which has emerged alongside the official program. Under this procedure
the private attorney representing the injured party is asked to handle the govern-
ment's claim along with the claim of his client. The government instituted this
system without statutory authority because of the shortage of trained .claims
personnel within the enforcement agencies and the heavy case load carried by
the various United States Attorneys. At the present time, this unofficial procedure
vastly overshadows the official one.' Recent increases in enforcement agency
personnel and the authorization for enforcement personnel to aid the United
States Attorneys in litigation involving the Act' may lead to a decline in the role
of the unofficial program, but it appears that it will be a considerable time, if
ever, before the unofficial procedure is completely abandoned. Obviously, this
10 Summaries of the various regulations can be found in either the Code of Federal Reg-
ulations or the Federal Register. See 32 C.F.R. §§ 537.21-.24 (1969) (Army); 32 C.F.R. §§
842.140-.146 (1968) (Air Force); 32 C.F.R. §§ 757.1-.14 (1969) (Navy); 38 C.F.R. §§
2.6(e) (1969) (Veterans Administration); Statement of Organization and Delegations of
Authority of the Office of the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare, §§ 2-300.50 and
2-300.50-1, 32 Fed. Reg. 5813 (1967) as amended 33 Fed. Reg. 5174 (1968) and § 2-300.50-2,
33 Fed. Reg. 5694 (1968).
11 28 C.F.R. §§ 43.1-.4 (1969).
12 While no government-wide figures are available, the Navy Department estimates that
seventy percent of its administrative collections are handled by private attorneys under such
arrangements. Cassady, The Federal Medical Care Recovery Act and Private Attorneys, April,
1968 (unpublished thesis -in the Judge Advocate General's School Library). If this figure
is typical, and there is no indication that it is not, of the 10,037 recoveries made during the
calendar year 1969, roughly 7,000 were handled hy private attorneys. 1969 statistics furnished
by the Department of Justice.
13 The Justice Department has authorized enforcement agency attorneys to aid the various
United States Attorneys. The extent of the aid is up to the individual United States Attorney.
Letter from William D. Ruckelshaus, Assistant Attorney General, Civil Division, to Torts
Branch, Litigation Division, Office of the Judge Advocate General, Department of the Army,
July 9, 1969, on file with the NoTRE DAME LAWYER.
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unofficial program, because of its pervasiveness, presents problems to the practic-
ing lawyer, his client, and the government.
Before beginning a detailed agency by agency description of the administra-
tion of the Act, however, several general comments and some definitions are
in order.
A. Agency Responsibility
First, it should be noted that five agencies handle the bulk of the claims
under the Act at the initial processing stage - the Army, Navy, 4 Air Force,
Veterans Administration, and Department of Health, Education, and Welfare."5
The primary responsibility for processing claims under the Act is tied to an
agency's obligation to furnish the injured party with medical care. 6 In many
cases such a link causes no great confusion because the treatment will be rendered
in facilities maintained by the agency having the responsibility of processing the
claim. But this is not always the case. The care may be given in a hospital run
by another agency or by a non-government-connected organization. In such event,
the agency with the responsibility of providing the care will pay the non-federal
hospital or reimburse the other federal agency and process the claim."
In addition to its primary responsibility, each agency has a secondary obliga-
tion to process those claims for treatment rendered in its facilities for which
no reimbursement is received from another agency. The most significant cases
in this category are those involving the treatment of civilian employees at the
Public Health Service hospitals." Normally the claims for the care of civilian
employees are handled exclusively under the Federal Employees Compensation
Act.' The Public Health Service, however, has special statutory authority to pro-
vide this care' and, when it provides it, no reimbursement is sought from the Em-
ployees Compensation Fund.' Instead, the cost is borne by the Service out of its
14 Presently the Navy is handling those claims involving Marine personnel and their de-
pendents. There are indications that this may change in the future. The Marine Corps has a
number of legally trained officers who have been serving in the Navy Judge Advocate Offices.
There is some talk that these officers will be withdrawn, and the Marine Corps will assume
responsibility for providing its own legal support, including the processing of claims. Letter
from E. Perry Johnson, Litigation and Claims Division Office of the Judge Advocate General,
Department of the Navy to Joseph Long, Oct. 1, 1970, on file with the No= DAME LAWYER.
15 The few claims generated by the Coast Guard are handled by the Department of
Health, Education, and Welfare through the Public Health Services. See 42 C.F.R., Part 31
(1968).
16 Cf. 10 U.S.C. § 1085 (Supp. I, 1966).
17 This practice is confusing for both the lawyer who is trying to find out which agency
to deal with and to the agencies themselves. Reimbursement is handled on the departmental
level on an annual basis, rather than on a case-by-case accounting. On the other hand,
notification of potential claims is handled on the local level between field offices of the
different agencies. The result is that in a large number of cases, the notices are delayed or not
forthcoming to the agency charged with collection of the claims. See 10 U.S.C. § 1085 (Supp.
II, 1966) ; see also Army Reg. 40-121 g 54 (Feb. 13, 1967).
18 These cases make up by far the largest number of cases handled by the Department
of Health; Education, and Welfare in terms of amount recovered.
19 5 U.S.C. §§ 8131-32 (1964).
20 42 U.S.C. § 251 (1964).
21 The fund was authorized in 5 U.S.C. § 1847 (1964). In the case of reimbursement
among the military services and the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare specific
authority is given by 10 U.S.C. § 1085 (Supp. II, 1966). The VA recovers from the De-
partment of Defense for the treatment of active duty and retired military personnel under 38
C.F.R. § 17.62(c) (1969).
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annual budget, and the Service seeks to recoup under the Act.22
B. Definitions
Throughout the article, the terms "compromise," "waiver for the con-
venience of the government," and "waiver for undue hardship on the injured
party," will be extensively used. These are words of art which apply to the
powers of various officers under the Act, and it is important to be conversant
with their specific implications.
1. COMPROMISE
Probably the easiest of the three to explain is "compromise." The Army,
by way of guidance for its personnel on the question of compromise, has in-
corporated"2 the Standards for Compromise of Claim,24 established under the
Federal Claims Collection Act.25 These standards indicate that there are a
variety of factors to be considered when a compromise decision is made. The
first factor is the tortfeasor's ability to pay the entire amount of the claim,
as well as the government's capacity to enforce payment within a reasonable
time.26 In determining the tortfeasor's ability to pay, the age and health of the
tortfeasor and his present and potential income are considered as well as the
amount of his insurance coverage. Next, the amount which could reasonably
be acceptable as a compromise amount must bear a reasonable relationship to
that figure. Other factors considered are the strength of the government's case,±r
the collection cost which would be incurred if suit is necessary,"8 and finally,
the impact of the case on the overall recovery program - whether compromise
in this case will jeopardize collection in other cases.29
The Air Force, on the other hand, takes a more practical approach. It
points out that in a vast majority of cases the only assets which are reasonably
available will be the tortfeasor's insurance policy." In reaching a realistic evalua-
tion of the amount that can be recovered, the Air Force places great stress on
the amount of this coverage. Further, the Air Force indicates that it is the policy
of the Department of Justice that the government's claim, under normal cir-
cumstances, should not exceed one-third of the gross collection." In situations
22 Likewise, there is no inter-agency reimbursement for out-patient care furnished. As a
result it is possible in a given case for two government agencies to have separate claims under
the Act.
23 Army Reg. 27-38, 1 4-3(a) (Jan. 15, 1969).
24 4 C.F.R. §§ 103.1-.9 (1969). These standards are not binding on recoveries under
the Act. They can. however, be used as guidelines, as the Army has done. Id. § 101.4.
25 31 U.S.C. §§ 951-53 (Supp. II, 1966).
26 4 C.F.R. § 103.2 (1969).
27 Id. § 103.3. In this regard the clearness of the liability, the availability of witnesses,
and the necessity for the medical treatment should be considered. Not infrequently military
hospitals hold a patient beyond the time when he would have been released by a civilian
hospital. In this case, the government should adjust its claim to eliminate the hospitalization
not medically required.
28 Id. § 103.4.
29 Id. § 103.5.




where the government's interest constitutes a substantial portion of the free
assets reasonably available for settlement, in order to encourage cooperation on
the part of the injured party's attorney, the Air Force will agree, prior to negotia-
tions with the tortfeasor, to accept a given percentage of the gross settlement,
whatever it may turn out to be. 2
Likewise, the Air Force respects the professional judgment of the injured
party's counsel. It realizes that for a number of reasons, he may feel that the
case warrants the acceptance of a settlement below the policy limits of the
tortfeasor's insurance coverage or the total assets reasonably available. Under
such circumstances, if the injured party for a legitimate reason 3 is willing to
accept such a reduced settlement, the Air Force will likewise scale down its de-
mand, but normally only by the same percentage the injured party does. 4
2.. WAIVER FOR THE CONVENIENCE OF THE GOVERNMENT
Both the Army and the Air Force are in agreement that "waiver for the
convenience of the government" has a very limited place in the collection pro-
gram. The phrase generally means that under the considered judgment of
the government, it will, for a multitude of reasons, be more convenient not to
press the claim. It is appropriate in three situations: (1) where, after assertion,
further investigation reveals that the tortfeasor if essentially judgment-proof; s8
(2) where, after diligent search," the tortfeasor cannot be located; and (3)
where the alleged tortfeasor and his insurance company adamantly refuse to
pay, and liability is sufficiently questionable so that the time and money involved
do not warrant suit by the United States Attorney.
3. WAIVER FOR UNDUE HARDSHIP ON THE INJURED PARTY
"Waiver for undue hardship on the injured party" is by far the most
difficult of these three powers to define and administer. It is, however, probably
32 Requests for such agreements must be approved by the staff judge advocate having the
necessary monetary settlement authority prior to formal agreement with the injured party's
attorney, Id. I 15-18(d).
33 The Air Force indicates it considers questionable liability, difficulty of proof, long delay
before trial, and undue expense of trial as legitimate reasons for settlement. Id. 11 15-18(a).
34 Thus, for example, if there was $20,000 coverage and the injured party's claim was
worth $12,000, and if the injured party wanted to settle for $8,000, the Air Force would reduce
its claim also by one-third. Id. I 15-18(b). It is possible for the private attorney to get the
agency to agree to accept a certain percentage of the gross settlement prior to entering into
negotiations where the government's medical represents a substantial part of the insurance
coverage available. Id. f 15-18(d).
35 Army Reg. 27-38, 1 4-4(c) (1) (Jan. 15, 1969) incorporating by reference 4 C.F.R. §
104.3 (1969) and Air Force Manual 112-1 11 15-17(a) '(Oct. 29, 1969).
36 In determining whether a tortfeasor is judgment-proof, more should be considered
than whether he is covered by liability insurance. His age and health should be taken into
account, along with his present income and future earning capacity, as well as any known
assets. An attempt should be made to determine whether he has secreted any assets or made
a fraudulent transfer to avoid liability. When a file is closed under this provision, no release
is given and the file can be re-opened at a later date should conditions change. Army Reg.
27-38, 11 5-2(b) (Jan. 15, 1969).
37 Often the absent tortfeasor can be traced through the automobile license tags even
after he moves, since most states maintain a continuous record for each vehicle registered.
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the one power most susceptible to abuse.88 The phrase is generally understood to
mean that in some cases the government will waive its claim since assertion
would cause undue hardship on an innocent party or produce inequitable re-
sults. The problem which faces the recovery agencies is to define the appropriate
scope of the waiver and to provide their claims personnel with sufficient guide-
lines to avoid abuse of the waiver power and its use as an unreasoned substitute
for one of the other settlement authorities. The Act, as well as writings about
the Act, 9 offers little to help the agencies in the solution of this problem. Some
of the agencies themselves have not come to grips with the question and have
attempted to deal with it on an ad hoc basis at the highest administrative level."
The result is that these agency regulations lend little to solution of the problem
beyond the statement, rather obvious to all, that the hardship must be real,
rather than imagined or potential.41
The Air Force is the only agency which has attempted to provide its person-
nel with any written guidance.42 The obvious first step is to determine whether
a hardship in fact exists. To do this the Air Force instructs its personnel to
make an accurate evaluation of the injured party's claim, considering: (1) any
permanent injuries incurred; (2) pain and suffering; (3) decreased earning
power; (4) any medical expenses which the injured party has borne or will
bear in the future.43 When an adequate money value for each of these items
has been reached through the use of available civilian damage authorities,"4
the total claim is adjusted by two further items. An adjustment is made for
the value of any government pension rights that may have accrued to the injured
party as a result of his injuries, and an allowance is made for attorney's fees
and the out-of-pocket costs in bringing a recovery action. If, after these adjust-
ments, the remaining total is more than the assets reasonably available,45. an
acknowledged financial hardship will be suffered if the government collects its
medical costs.
The second step is much more difficult. Acknowledging that the collection
of the medical costs will create a hardship for the injured party because it will
prevent him from receiving full compensation for his claim, the question, then,
is whether this hardship is an undue hardship and what action, if any, should
the government take to alleviate the situation. There are four possible answers,
38 The claims officer is much more apt to grant this type of waiver out of a feeling of
unreasoned sympathy for the injured party than he is to grant one of the other reductions
since they are based on more rational, unemotional grounds.
39 Only one author, Noone, Federal Medical Care Recovery Act, 55 A.B.A.J. 259, 260
(1969) mentions this problem and even then he mentions it only in passing.
40 See Army Reg. 27-38, 11 4-3(d) (Jan. 15, 1969). Only two agencies have delegated
this authority to the field. See Air Force Manual 112-1, Table 15-8 '(Oct. 29, 1969); Re-
delegation within the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, 33 Fed. Reg. 5694, §
2-300.50-2 (1968).
41 See e.g., Air Force Manual 112-1, 1 15-17(b) (Oct. 29, 1969).
42 32 C.F.R. § 842.144 (1968). See also note 41, supra.
43 32 C.F.R. § 842.144(a) (1968).
44 See e.g., BELLI, MODERN TRIALS '(1960); JURY VERDICTS RESEARCH, INC., PERSONAL
INJURY VALUATION HANDBOOKS (1969). In using these books, it should be remembered that
juries often award astronomical judgments which are never completely satisfied. Evaluation of
injuries based upon reported jury verdicts may, therefore, render a distorted picture of what
an injury is worth in terms of money actually recovered.
45 Again, in determining what assets are reasonably available, other things -should be con-
sidered beyond insurance coverage. See note 36, supra.
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each of which has some support among the government enforcement personnel.
The alternatives are best illustrated through the use of a hypothetical case.
Assume the injured party has a claim which, under the standards of the previous
paragraph, is acknowledged to be worth $20,000, but that the only reasonably
available means to recover is from the tortfeasor's $10,000 liability insurance
policy. Assume further that the government has a medical claim for $5,000.
The first alternative is obvious. The government could demand its full $5,000
and leave the injured party and his attorney to divide the remainder. Assuming
that the attorney charges the usual one-third contingent fee and calculates it on
the basis of the gross recovery," his fee will be roughly $3,300, not including
expenses. This leaves the injured party with a recovery of $1,700 for an injury
acknowledged to be worth $20,000. Second, the government could settle for a
pro rata share based on the limited assets available. In our example, this would
amount to only fifty percent of the value of the injury; the government would
claim $2,500. The resulting gross recovery of $7,500 would be further reduced
by attorney's fees and expenses, leaving the injured party with a recovery ap-
proximating $4,200. Still another approach would be to apply the Department
of Justice standard that the government's recovery should not exceed one-third
of the gross settlement.' Applying this to the example, the government's daim
would be reduced from $5,000 to a little more than $3,300. Subtracting at-
torney's fees and expenses, the injured party would net about $3,300. Finally,
the government could waive its claim entirely. Even then the injured party must
still pay the attorney and would receive approximately $6,700 for his injuries.
In actual practice the question of waiver is often complicated by the absence
of any clearly recognizable damages, e.g., the injured party's claim may be
based almost entirely upon pain and suffering. The key to this problem would
seem to lie in the basic policy behind the Act. The whole tenor of the General
Accounting Office's report" reviving the idea of collection, was that the govern-
ment was spending vast sums of money for medical treatment which, because of
an unfortunate decision of the Supreme Court," it was unable to recover. As
a result, in those cases where the tortfeasor has sufficient assets to satisfy a judg-
ment for both personal injuries and medical expenses, there was an undeserved
windfall. Either the tortfeasor was escaping liability through the injured party's
inability to claim these damages or the injured party may have been recovering
expehses he had not incurred. Where the tortfeasor is paying the maximum
amount that he can be forced to provide, but this does not fully compensate the
victim, the injured party receives no windfall because he is not being adequately
46 For a discussion of the propriety of fees based on gross amounts of recovery, and other
related considerations, see text accompanying notes 223-33, infra.
The Air Force takes the position that the fee charged is a matter purely between the
attorney and injured party. Air Force Manual 112-1, Annotation to 11 15-14(e) (Oct. 29,
1969).
47 Air Force Manial 112-1, 11 15-18(c) (Oct. 29, 1969).
48 COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES, REVIEW OF THE GOVERNMENT'S
RIGHTS AND PRACTICES CONCERNING REcOVERY OF THE COST OF HOSPITAL AND MEDICAL
SERVICES IN NEGLIGENT THIRD-PARTY CASES (1960).
49 United States v. Standard Oil, 332 U.S. 301 (1947).
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recompensed for his injuries.5" Any recovery by the government under those facts
would be at the expense of full compensation to the injured party.
Congressional intent is not clearly evident from either the language of the
statute or the Congressional reports.5" It .is possible to infer that it was not the
Congressional intent to enrich the United States at the expense of the injured
party from the following statutory language:
No -action taken by the United States in connection with the rights af-
forded under this legislation shall operate to deny to the injured person
the recovery for that portion of his damages not covered hereunder.52
This provision was added to the Act by the House Judiciary Committee. In
making its report on the Act, the Committee said of the addition:
50 Some would dispute this statement claiming that the windfall to the injured party was
the government's payment for the treatment in the first instance. They would argue that had
the government not paid for the care, the injured party would have had to do so regardless of
whether the settlement was adequate or not, since the doctors and hospitals will not reduce
their claims. Certainly this is true in the case of the attorney's fee which must be paid regard-
less of whether the settlement is adequate to compensate the injured party. People taking this
position will say that if the hospital, doctors, and lawyers are not willing to adjust their claims
"to provide the injured party with full compensation why should the government be expected
to? There would seem to be two answers to this argument. First, it can be rather persuasive-
ly argued that the injured party is entitled to this care as a part of the compensation for ser-
vices performed for the government by himself or his sponsor. Therefore, such treatment is
similar to that provided by a pre-paid health plan such as Blue Cross-Blue Shield furnished
by any civilian employer. Thus, there is no windfall. United States v. Freese, Civil No.
66C69(2) (E.D. Mo., Dec. 30, 1966); accord, Kickham v. Carter, 335 'S.W.2d 83 (1960);
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Fuller, 232 Ark. 329, 336 S.W.2d 60 (1960); contra,
United States v. Greene, 266 F. Supp. 976 (N.D. Ill. 1967). See also, Long, Government
Recovery Beyond the Federal Medical Recovery Act, 14 S. DAKOTA L. REv. 20, 41-42 (1969).
Second, the government is not in the same position as the lawyer or doctor who must earn
his living by handling this type of case. As the sovereign, it must maintain a reputation for
magnanimity, willing to forego its legal rights when to enforce them would result in an oppres-
sive hardship to one of its citizens.
There is some question whether an injured party should be allowed to continue including
the costs of his medical care as an item of damages under the collateral source rule. To date
only one case has considered the matter. In Arvin v. Patterson, 427 S.W.2d 643 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1968), the court allowed the injured party to recover these costs. This has led one
commentator to conclude that the injured party's rights under the collateral source rule have
not changed under the Act. See Comment, 23 RUTGERs L. REv. 141 (1968). However, a
careful reading of the case will reveal such a conclusion is not warranted. The court merely
held that these damages should be allowed where the government, for any reason, is barred
from recovery. Such a result is consistent with the purpose of the collateral source rule of
preventing an undeserved windfall to the tortfeasor because someone other than the injured
party has borne the expense of his treatment. Where the government's interest is not barred,
the problem is not unlike that where the husband furnishes the medical care to his wife or
minor child. Case law has established that government's interest is a separate and distinct
statutory right, independent of any interest of the injured party. See, e.g., United States v.
York, 398 F.2d 582 (6th Cir. 1968); United States v. Merrigan, 389 F.2d 21 (3d Cir. 1968).
The doctrine, therefore, would seem equally inappropriate here as in the case of the husband
and wife or minor child maintaining separate suits. In either case, application of the collateral
source rule would subject the tortfeasor to double liability in order to provide the injured party
with an unjustified windfall.
Yet, because the government often does not seek to enforce its rights, it would seem
appropriate under the rationale of Arvin to allow the injured party initially to recover
these costs in a suit where the government takes no part, as long as he provides the tortfeasor
with some type of agreement that he will be responsible for handling and paying any claim
that the government may later assert. See United States v. Nation, 299 F. Supp. 266 (N.D.
Okla. 1969).
51 S. Rnp. No. 1945, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. '(1962); H.R. REP. No. 1534, 87th Cong., 2d
Sess. (1962).
52 42 U.S.C. § 2652(c) (1970).
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It is- intended that this right would be exercised without affecting the
rights of that individual to recover for losses and damages peculiar to
him and in which the Government has no direct interest.
5 3
How much greater effect can the government have on the rights of the in-
jured party than to prevent him from securing them to the fullest extent possible?
It is therefore submitted that the only legitimate question to be considered in
the granting of a hardship waiver is whether a financial hardship on the injured
party will in fact exist. If such a situation is found to exist by the application of
the standards outlined above, regardless of whether the claim is based upon
permanent injuries or pain and suffering, the agency should waive all or any
portion of the government's claim necessary to assure the injured party's recovery
to the extent of his injuries.
To date, only the Air Force has been willing to state its position in writing.
It has adopted a position substantially similar to the one just outlined. If the
tortfeasor makes an offer of settlement which includes all his assets reasonably
recoverable, and this offer is less than the acknowledged value of the injury
claim, the Air Force stands ready, at the request of the injured party's attorney,
to waive any or all of the government's claim. 4 The difficulty with the Air
Force's approach is that it is not broad enough to cover many cases where a
partial waiver would be appropriate. In a substantial number of cases the
settlement offer will be larger than the injury claim, but less than the combined
injury and medical claim. In such cases it would seem that the government
should grant a partial waiver only, reducing the govenment's claim so that the
combined total equals the settlement offer.5 5
4. JUDICIAL REVmW
One further point concerning the powers of waiver and compromise merits
brief comment. These powers are granted by the Act itself to the heads of the
various recovery agencies to be used in their discretion. 6 If a request for either
53 S. REP. No. 1945, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. (1962); H.R. REP. No. 1534, 87th Cong., 2d
Sess. (1962). The Senate, in its report, said:
In the Committee's opinion, it is not intended that this legislation should be used
to recover Federal hospital and medical costs when the total recovery possible is in-
sufficient, under all the circumstances, to provide fair and adequate compensation to
the injured party for his own losses. S. REP. No. 1945, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1962).
The Senate went specifically about this section:
This section makes it clear that the right of recovery granted to the Government
by the bill shall not impair the right of the injured person to recover for himself
damages other than the cost of hospital and medical care furnished by the Govern-
ment, and no action taken by the Government in connection with its right of recov-
ery shall have that effect. Id.
54 Air Force Manual 112-1, 15-17(b) '(Oct. 29, 1969).
55 The Air Force, unfortunately, creates confusion between the various settlement authori-
ties by treating the partial waiver problem under the compromise settlement authority. Id. The
Army also allows its field offices to treat a request for a waiver for undue hardship as a compro-
mise and handle it as such to the extent of their compromise authority. Army Reg. 27-38, 1
4-4(b) (2) (Jan. 15, 1969).
56 42 U.S.C. § 2652(b) (Supp. II, 1966).
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a compromise or waiver is refused by the agency head," this decision may be
subject to judicial review for abuse of discretion. This question has been raised
in only one unreported case, State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Go. v.
Alston."'
On the basis of this case, one author seems to conclude that the agency de-
cision is not subject to judicial review. 9 A careful reading of the case, however,
indicates that this conclusion is unjustified. The facts of the case were undisputed.
Four servicemen were injured and each sought to recover. The tortfeasor's only
available assets consisted of two separate insurance policies with a total liability
limit of $15,000. All parties concerned"0 acknowledged that the injuries to one
of the men alone justified a judgment in his favor for the entire amount of
the policies. The court subsequently found that the value of the other men's
claims amounted to a total of $11,400. When the government refused to waive
its medical claim of $4,578, the injured parties sought to review its decision.
The court acknowledged that the facts would have supported a waiver
had the government seen fit to grant one. It was unwilling, however, to reverse
the decision as an abuse of the statutory discretion.6' There were a number of
factors,6" including the fact that the government would have to pay the perma-
nently disabled servicemen a pension for the remainder of their lives, which
the court felt could have led the government to refuse the request in good faith.
Therefore, instead of holding that there is no review, the court indicated that
review would be appropriate, albeit the standard for abuse would seem to be
extremely high. It remains to be seen whether this case will be followed and
whether the burden of proof for reversal will remain as high.
With these general observations in mind a more detailed consideration of
each specific agency is in order.
II. The Military Services
A. The Army
While the Army, like all agencies, has both a primary and secondary
responsibility under the Act,0 3 by far the vast majority of its claims arise out of
57 If the request is first refused by one of the lower levels within the agency, it would
seem that the injured party would have to exhaust his administrative remedies by appeal up
the agency chain of authority to the head of the agency before seeking a judicial review of the
decision. See generally, Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 139 (1967); 5 U.S.C. §
1009(c) (1964).
58 Civil No. 11,072 (W.D. La., Jan. 17, 1967).
59 Noone, Federal Medical Care Recovery Act, 55 A.B.A.J. 259, 261 (1969).
60 One insurance company disagreed claiming that all injuries to all four servicemen could
be paid out of the primary coverage of $10,000 and that its excess coverage of $5,000 would
not have to be touched. This appears to be a rather unrealistic position.
61 "We do not believe that the discretionary power of the agency head has been abused."
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Alston, Civil No. 11,072 at 10 (W.D. La., Jan. 17, 1967).
62 The court did not enumerate the various factors which it felt prompted the govern-
ment's decision not to grant the waiver other than the pension rights of the disabled servicemen.
63 The secondary responsibility of the military is limited to the occasional case involving
treatment of government, non-military personnel who are authorized treatment at military
facilities. See Army Reg. 40-3 111 9-37.5 (Mar. 26, 1962). See, e.g., Department of Health,




the medical treatment of military personnel, either active or retired, and their
dependents."' The Army recovery organization reflects this fact in its three-stage
composition. The first stage is the Recovery Judge Advocate (RJA). Because
of the notification requirements, which will be discussed below, the RJA is
normally the judge advocate charged with providing legal support to a major
military hospital. 5 He is assigned a geographical area of responsibility and
processes any claims which result from medical treatment first being given the
injured party within his area." This is true regardless of whether the injured
party was a dependant or service member, whether the care was furnished by a
military or civilian hospital, or whether the injured party was subsequently trans-
ferred to another -hospital outside the area. The key, then, to which RJA is to
assume responsibility for processing a claim is the geographic location where
medical treatment was first rendered.67 Usually the geographic area assigned
to the RJA coincides with that of the military hospital he serves."
The next level above the RJA is the Staff Judge Advocate for the Army-
area. 9 This officer is charged with the appointment and general supervision of
the Recovery Judge Advocates within his Army-area." Finally, there is the Litiga-
tion Division, Office of the Judge Advocate General, in Washington." As its
name suggests, this office, in addition to formulating general policy for the pro-
gram, attempts to settle all claims which cannot be disposed of by the lower two
elements and it coordinates actions with the Department of Justice should suit
be necessary to collect the claim.
Quite obviously the starting point in the recovery process is when the RJA
learns that a person has received medical care within his area for injuries suf-
fered under circumstances which might give rise to a claim under the Act.
While Army regulations require service personnel to give notice when they or
any member of their family are injured, as a practical matter under the present
system, the RJA must rely almost exclusively upon the medical service personnel
who administer the military hospitals or pay for the civilian care for this vital
64 Under various statutes these beneficiaries are entitled to care in military hospitals if the
facilities and personnel are available. If care cannot be provided by the military hospitals, then
they are entitled to care at Army expense in civilian hospitals. In addition to the groups men-
tioned in the text, the dependents of deceased military personnel are also entitled to medical
care. See 10 U.S.C. §§ 1071-87 (Supp. II, 1966).
65 Army Reg. 27-38, f 5-1(a)(1) (Jan. 15, 1969). A summary of the Army Regulation
may be found in 32 C.F.R. §§ 537.21-.24 (1969). Between revisions of the Army Regulation,
the Judge Advocate General forwards to the various RJAs new information or changes in policy
by way of Federal Medical Care Recovery Act Letters. Each of these letters bears the year of
issue and the number of the letter in the series for that year, e.g., 469 was the fourth such letter
issued in 1969.
66 Army Reg. 27-38 1 3-1 (Jan. 15, 1969).
67 There are provisions for the transfer of a claim from one Recovery Judge Advocate to
another under certain conditions. Id. 1 3-3.
68 Id. 1 5-1(a)(2).
69 Id. 1 5-1. The United States is divided into five Army-areas. The First Army is located
at Fort Meade, Md.; the Third at Fort McPherson, Ga.; the Fourth at Fort Sam Houston,
Tex.; the Fifth at Fort Sheridan, Ill.; and the Sixth at The Presidio of San Francisco, Calif.
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information." The administrative procedure for handling hospitalization varies
according to whether the care is furnished in a military or civilian hospital, or
whether the injured party is an active service member or is a dependant or
retired member. As a result, the RJA receives his information from a number
of sources and in widely differing forms.
Where the care is furnished in an Army hospital, the hospital commander
is required7" to notify the RJA of the treatment of any person suffering from an
injury7 4 and to give all available information concerning the injury received within
twenty-four hours after the patient's admission.7 5 If the treatment is performed
in a hospital run by one of the other services, normally the commander of that
installation will supply the same information to the Army RJA under the pro-
visions of his own service regulations. 0
Should an active member of the Army receive civilian care, the commander
of the Army-area in which the treatment was rendered is responsible for paying
civilian hospital and doctor bills. This responsibility is normally delegated to
the various military hospitals within the Army-area on a geographical basis and
is handled by a special medical claims section within the hospital.77 This medical
claims section is required to give the RJA the same type of information the
hospital commander would have given had the treatment been furnished directly
by the military hospital.
7 8
The major problem in the present notice system is collection of information
concerning the treatment of the dependents and retired personnel at civilian
facilities. The availability of this care is standardized throughout the uniformed
72 Army Reg. 40-121 (Feb. 13, 1967). This notification system has been subjected to a
great deal of criticism for being slow and for failing to provide the necessary notice in many
cases. See, Letter Report B-133142 from Defense Division, General Accounting Office, to
Secretary of Defense, Dec. 2, 1968, on file with the NOTRE DAME LAWYER. The Army has
suggested that its Recovery Judge Advocate set up unofficial notification systems by the use of
other types of Army reports. See Army Reg. 27-38, 3-1(d) (Jan. 15, 1969) ; Department of
Army Pamphlet No. 27-162, Claims, 11.4(b) at 156 (Jan. 1968).
73 Army Reg. 40-16, 1 3 (Mar. 24, 1969).
74 As opposed to those cases involving disease. No distinction is made in regard to whether
or not the injured party is an active or retired member or dependent. Likewise, the hospital is
not to attempt to screen the cases to eliminate those cases-where no claim exists. In the past,
the hospitals have tried to do this with the result that some potential claims were lost since the
hospital personnel are not legally trained. See Letter Report B-133142 from Defense Division,
General Accounting Office, to Secretary of Defense, Dec. 2, 1968, on file with the NOTRE
DAM E LAWYER.
75 This information is to be transmitted on DA Form 2985, Admissions and Dispositions
Sheet, Absent Sick Work sheet. If the RJA feels that the tortfeasor could be liable, he notifies
the medical facility. The facility then submits DA Form 2631-R, indicating the length of the
hospitalization and the cost. See, Army Reg. 40-16, 3 (Mar. 24, 1969).
76 In most cases, the Army maintains a Medical Detachment at the major hospitals of the
other uniformed services. See Army Reg. 40-3, 11 70 (Mar. 26, 1962). Normally, this informa-
tion will be transmitted to the Army Recovery Judge Advocate through the Commander of this
Medical Detachment. Multi-service regulations, Army Reg. 40-121, 1 54 (Feb. 13, 1967), im-
pose a duty on the injured member and the commander of the hospital facility to notify the
appropriate judge advocate of the injury.
77 Army Reg. 40-16, 4 (Mar. 24, 1969); Army Reg. 40-3, 88 (Sept. 13, 1967).
78 Army Reg. 40-16 ff 4(a) (March 24, 1969). According to this section, the Recovery
Judge Advocate receives copies of the paid vouchers, DA forms 8-9 or 8-17, for the civilian
care. Since the insurance companies want a more detailed indication of the treatment which
was rendered than these vouchers contain, the medical claims section should also en-lose a
copy of the detailed hospital and doctor's bill. See Address by Edward S. Ring, Vice President,
Government Employees Insurance Company, to 30th Annual NAIIA Convention, Portland,
Oregon, May, 1967, on file with the NOTRE DAME LAWYER, admonishing insurance claims per-
sonnel to demand and study the entire hospital record including nurse's notes.
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services and controlled by a single multi-service regulation; 9 the program is
administered as a unit. No distinction is made as to the parent branch of the
retiree or dependent's sponsor. The government has contracted with various
civilian firms s" to act as the government's agent to process and pay bills arising
under such treatment. Each of these contract agents is responsible for a specific
geographical area.8' As a result of this uniform bill paying system, the contract
agents make no attempt to sort them according to the service of the sponsor
or to determine whether a claim under the Act might be involved. The paid
bills are funneled into the office of Civilian Health and Medical Program of
the Uniformed Services, located in Denver, Colorado, by the various contract
agents. Here, the bills are sorted according to the sponsor's service. An attempt
is also made to determine if there is a potential claim under the Act.82 Cases in-
volving potential claims are then turned over to the various services.13 They
eventually filter back to the RJA in the geographical area where the treatment
was first rendered for his action.
8 4
Once the RJA has received these notices, he makes an initial screening on
the basis of the accompanying information and decides if, in his opinion, a
potential claim exists.8 5 If so, he immediately notifies the prospective defendant,
his lawyer, and the defendant's insurance company of the government's tentative
79 This regulation is Army Reg. 40-121 (Feb. 13, 1967); Air Force Reg. 168-9; Navy
SECNAV Instruction 6320.80; Public Health Service General Circular No. 6, and Coast
Guard Instruction No. 6320.2A (Feb. 13, 1967).
80 Usually these firms are the local Blue Cross-Blue Shield agencies or a health insurance
company. See 10 U.S.C. § 1082 (1954) which establishes an advisory committee for the ad-
ministration of the civilian health care program. See also 32 C.F.R. § 70.507 (1970), 32 C.F.R.
§ 577.60(c) (1) (1970), and 32 C.F.R. Subpart A '(1970).
81 The name, address, and area of responsibility of each of these contract agents is listed
in Appendix A of the multi-service regulation, note 79, supra.
82 Unlike the commander of the military hospital or the medical claims sections which
exercise no discretion and report all injury cases, this office screens out those cases where the
injury was suffered -in such a way that no claim could arise under the Act. It is admonished,
however, to transmit all doubtful cases, Army Reg. 40-16, 1 5(b) (Mar. 24, 1969).
83 Under the former regulation, 27-38 (Sept. 29, 1967), the Executive Director gave
vouchers DA Forms 1863-1 and 1863-2, along with DA Form 3154, to the Adjutant General
who in turn forwarded them to the Judge Advocate General for distribution down the chain
of command through the Army-area Staff Judge Advocate to the Recovery Judge Advocate.
This system meant that it was often more than a year after the injury before the Recovery
Judge Advocate first learned of the potential claim and could act upon it. In order to elimi-
nate this delay, the system has been changed. The new regulation 27-38, ff 5-1(b) *(Jan. 15,
1969) requires the name and area of responsibility of each Recovery Judge Advocate to be
furnished to the Judge Advocate on the staff of the Executive Director. Army Regulation
40-16 1 5 (Mar. 24, 1969) requires the Executive Director to furnish notice directly to the
Recovery Judge Advocate. This regulatory scheme has been altered slightly by the Judge
Advocate General in Federal Medical Recovery Act Letter No. 469, Aug. 20, 1969. The
regulatory scheme is to be followed if a single recovery judge advocate has the recovery respon-
sibility for the entire state where the first hospitalization was rendered. If, however, the state
is divided between two or more Recovery Judge Advocates, due to the lack of personnel in
the Executive Director's office, no attempt is made to sort the potential claims by geographical
area within the state and the claims are forwarded to the Army-area Staff Judge Advocate
for sorting and distribution.
84 There are provisions where a service member may pay for his own care or the care of
his dependents and then recover this from the Army. See Army Reg. 40-3, 1 92(f) (Sept. 13,
1967) and Army Reg. 40-121, f 32(g) (Feb. 13, 1967). In these cases the officer approving
the reimbursement has an obligation to inform the Recovery Judge Advocate of a potential
claim on Standard Form 1034. See Army Reg. 27-38, 3-1(c) '(Jan. 15, 1969).
85 Army Reg. 27-38, 3-2(b) (Jan. 15, 1969). If he feels that a particular injury does
not involve liability under the Act, he will make a notation to this effect on the notification
sheet and return it to the person giving him the notice.
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interest in the case.86 At the same time the RJA contacts the injured party and
advises him of the government's rights under the Act, pointing out the injured
party's duty to cooperate with the government. He also attempts to obtain a
statement from the injured party concerning the accident.8 The injured party is
advised that he should not settle or release his claim without first contacting
the RJA. The RJA also requests the name and address of the injured party's
attorney.
88
Next, the RJA investigates the case and assembles information as to how
the injury occurred."9 On the basis of this investigation, he will evaluate the
grounds for the legal liability of the prospective defendant. If his investigation
shows no liability, he informs the office which gave him the initial notice of
potential claim of this fact and closes his file. 0 If, on the other hand, his in-
vestigation indicates liability on the part of the tortfeasor, he then determines
the cost of the care rendered by the government. If this amount is less than
$100, he may let the matter drop.9" If, however, the claim exceeds $100, he
makes a formal payment demand upon the tortfeasor and his insurance company,
if known.'2 At the same time, if the facts indicate, the RJA will take steps to
protect the government's rights under any uninsured motorist coverage, state
unsatisfied judgment act, workmen's compensation statute or the like. 3
If voluntary payment is received from the tortfeasor in the full amount of
the demand, no further action is necessary and the file is closed. 4 If, however,
full payment is refused, the RJA may enter into settlement negotiations, unless
86 Id. 3-2(d)(3).
87 At this time the injured party will be -informed that a failure to cooperate with the
overnment or to furnish the requested statement concerning the facts surrounding the acci-
ent will result in the government medical records dealing with the diagnoses and treatment
of the injured party being withheld. It is specifically indicated, however, that the refusal on
the part of the injured party's attorney to protect or assert the government's claim is not
ounds for withholding medical records. Id. 3-5(b). In the past it was also customary for
the Recovery Judge Advocate to take an assignment of the government's claim from the in-
jured party on Standard Form 96-A. The Justice Department has maintained from the
beginning that the Act gives the government both an independent statutory right and statutory
subrogation to the rights of the injured party. In either case no formal assignment would be
necessary, and the practice of taking such an assignment has almost disappeared. It may still
be done, however, in a particular case if the Judge Advocate feels some benefit is gained.
88 Id. 3-5.
89 In securing information in this investigation, the Recovery Judge Advocate can request
the assistance of any other federal agency. Id. 3-3. See also 28 C.F.R. § 43.1(a) '(1969).
90 Id. f 3-6(a). If, at a later date, an offer is received from the tortfeasor, the file will be
reopened.
91 Id. 1 2-4. For an article pointing out that a large number of these claims can be suc-
cessfully collected at minimal expense to the government, see Mog, Hospital Recovery Claims-
Claims Under $100. 7 AF JAG L. Rv. 19 (1965).
92 Army Reg. 27-38, If 3-6(d) (4) (Jan. 15, 1969). This is done on Standard Form 96.
There are some exceptions where no claims will be asserted. No claims will be asserted against
another federal government agency, government employee, service member, or his dependent
unless he is covered by liability insurance or is guilty of gross negligence or willful misconduct.
Likewise, no claim will be asserted against a foreign government or government contractors
without prior approval of the Litigation Division. Id. 2-2.
93 Id. If 4.2.
94 A release of the government's claim will be given. Id. If 5-2(b). Such a release will
not contain an indemnity agreement or purport to release the injured party's claim. The sug-
gested release form is found in Appendix C of the regulation. No release will be given where
a claim has been waived. The tortfeasor will also be given a receipt for payment. See Appen-
dix D to Army Reg. 27-38 (Jan. 15, 1969).
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he has already arranged for the injured party's attorney to handle the govern-
ment's interest along with that of his client's.95
In the negotiation process, the RJA has certain limitations placed upon his
authority to act in the government's behalf.9 If the original amount of the
claim exceeds $20,000, 9" he can make no settlement short of full recovery without
specific case-by-case authorization from the Department of Justice." Where the
original amount of the claim is less than $20,000, he may not settle the claim
by compromise where such action will reduce the claim more than $3,500. "
He may not waive any amount exceeding $1,000. °° He also has no authority to
waive any claim because of undue hardship on the injured party.
1 0'
When an offer of compromise or waiver which exceeds his authority is
received, he forwards the claim, with his recommendation, to the Army-area
Staff Judge Advocate. 2 This office can accept the compromise or waiver of
a claim so long as the compromise or waiver does not reduce it by more than
$5,000.' If the request exceeds this figure, the claim must be forwarded to
the Litigation Division, Office of the Judge Advocate General, in Washington.
This office has the authority to accept any waiver or compromise in a claim of
less than $20,000."'1
If the RJA receives a request for a waiver of the government's claim based
upon an undue hardship to the injured party, he will forward this request, with
his recommendations and any other pertinent information, through the Army-
area Judge Advocate to the Litigation Division. Only this office has the authority
to grant an undue hardship waiver, in whole or in part.'
In the event the tortfeasor or his insurance company, after reasonable
negotiations, refuses to acknowledge liability or make an offer of settlement
acceptable to the government, the RJA has two alternatives. He may either
95 Such agreements make up the unofficial collection procedure. See text following note
173, infra.
96 It should be remembered that the Recovery Judge Advocate's authority results from'
a delegation by the President through the Attorney-General to the Department of the Army
and from there down the chain of command. Each delegator has reserved some control for
himself. See Army Reg. 27-38, 4-3 (Jan. 15, 1969).
97 Id. For determination of the amount of the claim, the treatment costs for all injuries aris-
ing out of the same incident are totalled. For example, if three servicemen were riding in a car
struck by the prospective defendant and each soldier received $10,000 worth of medical care,
the Recovery Judge Advocate could not compromise or waive any part of the claim since it
would be treated as a single claim for $30,000 rather than three separate claims for $10,000
each. Id. ff 4-4.
98 28 C.F.R. § 43.3 (1969).
99 Army Reg. 27-38, % 4-3(a)(1) (Jan. 15, 1969).
100 Id. ff 4-3(a)(2).
101 Id. This statement should be qualified because 4-4(b) (2) indicates that the RJA
can treat a request for a hardship waiver as a suggestion for compromise and grant the waiver
as a compromise within his compromise authority.
102 It is possible for the Army-area Judge Advocate to delegate his settlement authority
by telephone to the Recovery Judge Advocate on a case-by-case basis. Ijkewise, it is possible
to get prior approval to settle a case for a certain percentage of the total recovery. See id.
ff 4-4(b) (3).
103 Id. IT 4-3(b).
104 Id. 4-3(d).
105 Id. As indicated in note 101, supra, however, both the RJA and the Army-area Staff
Judge Advocate can treat a request for a waiver as an offer to compromise and handle the waiv-
er on this basis within their respective compromise authority. A more detailed analysis of the
difference between waiver for the convenience of the government, waiver for undue hardship
upon the injured, and compromise is undertaken in text accompanying notes 23-55, supra.
[Winter, 1971]
FEDERAL MEDICAL CARE RECOVERY ACT
forward the claim to the Army-area Staff Judge Advocate for further nego-
tiations, should such appear warranted or, if he feels that further negotiations
would be to no avail, and the claim is for less than $5,000 or does not involve
a new point of law, he can turn the case over to the United States Attorney
for the District in which the defendant resides for legal recourse.1°6 If the claim
is for more than $5,000, involves a new point of law, or involves collection from
the injured party or his attorney,' the RJA forwards the claim through the
Army-area Staff Judge Advocate to the Litigation Division. The Litigation
Division will then present the case to the Department of Justice for action.0 s
B. The Air Force
The Air Force recovery program in many ways parallels that of the Army'
09
Like the Army, it is geographically oriented to the place of initial treatment.
The Air Force notice process and the handling of claims are essentially the same
as those of the Army."0 There are, however, three differences between these
programs which are worth noting.
First, the Air Force divides the lowest level of its claims system into two
parts. The first of these is the Base Judge Advocate, whose duties and responsi-
bilities correspond to the Army Recovery Judge Advocate. The second part is
the Staff Advocate of the major Air Command exercising general courts-martial
jurisdiction. These two levels may often be combined since the Base Judge
Advocate is often the Judge Advocate of the Command which exercises general
courts-martial jurisdiction. This is not always the case, however, especially
where the smaller Air Force bases and stations are concerned. The only sig-
nificant difference between the Base Judge Advocate and the Staff Judge
Advocate is the extent of their authority to compromise and waive claims.
Second, the two services differ in their approach to field settlement
authority. The Army, as was seen earlier,"' does not limit the size of the claim
which can be handled by the RJA within the $20,000 limitation placed on it
by the Department of Justice." Instead it limits the amount by which the RJA
106 Id. 1 4-5(c). Such a referral may take place at an earlier date if either the injury party
or the alleged tortfeasor files suit based on the accident. Id. 1 4-5(a).
107 See note 9, supra, for a discussion of the problems involved in collection from the client.
Problems with collection from the injured party's attorney will be discussed in the section deal-
ing with the unofficial recovery program; see text following note 173, infra.
108 Army Reg. 27-38, 4-5(d) (Jan. 15, 1969).
109 The Air Force recovery program is governed by Chapter 15 of Air Force Manual 112-1
(Oct. 29, 1969). A summary of this program is found at 32 C.F.R. §§ 842.140-.146 (1968).
110 There is one exception in the notification system. Under Army Reg. 27-38 (Jan. 15,
1969), notification of potential claims arising from the care of dependents and retired per-
sonnel will come directly from the Judge Advocate in the Office for the Civilian Health and
Medical Program of the Uniform Services '(OCHAMPUS). The Air Force continues to follow
the former system of having such notice go first to the Litigation Division, Office of the Judge
Advocate General, and then down through the general court-martial authority to the Base
Judge Advocate. See, Air Force Manual 112-1, Ch. 15. Tables 15-6 and 15-8 (Oct. 29, 1969).
Between revisions of the manual, the Judge Advocate General keeps the various field offices
abreast of new developments and changes of policy by items in the Air Force Reporter, a publi-
cation containing legal information of general interest to Air Force JAG personnel. Each issue is
identified by the year of its issue and the number within the series for that year, e.g., AFJAG
REPTR. 11 (1966).
111 See text at note 99, supra.
112 28 C.F.R. § 43.3 (1969).
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can reduce a claim. The Air Force, on the other hand, has chosen to retain dollar
limitations on the authority of each level to handle a claim." As a result the
RJA could compromise a $15,000 claim for $13,500 because he has the power
to reduce the claim up to $3,500." The Air Force Base Judge Advocate could
not do this because he cannot compromise or settle any claim where the amount
compromised exceeds $1,000.15 The same distinction is found throughout the
system. The Staff Judge Advocate of the Command exercising general court-
martial jurisdiction can only compromise amounts up to $2,500, while the Staff
Judge Advocate for a major Command can only handle amounts not exceeding
$5,000.
The final difference lies in the ability of the field offices to grant waiver for
undue hardship to the injured party. In the case of the Army, none of the field
offices can grant such a waiver." They can, however, consider such request as
an offer to compromise and handle it under that guise up to the amount of
their compromise authority." 8 The Air Force does away with this fiction and
allows its offices at all levels to grant these undue hardship waivers within the
limits of their dollar authority."9
C. The Navy
The Navy recovery program, unlike the other uniformed services, is
characterized by a centralization of authority."' While the Army and Air Force
use a three- or four-level organization, the Navy has reduced this to two, the
field and the office of the Judge Advocate General in Washington."'- The field
level, called "JAG Designees," consists of the Commander and District Legal Officer
of the various Naval Districts."' As a result of this centralization, and the fact
that the Navy does not maintain a large number of installations throughout the
country, the Navy is more apt to request the assistance from one of the other
government agencies in the investigation or assertion of its claims."'
113 The Army had this system under former Army Reg. 27-38 (Sept. 29, 1967).
114 Army Reg. 27-38, f 4-3(a) (Jan. 15, 1969).
115 Air Force Manual 112-1, Ch. 15, Table 15-8 (Oct. 29, 1969).
116 Id.
117 Army Reg. 27-38, % 4-3(d) (Jan. 15, 1969).
118 Id. f 4-4(b).
119 Air Force Manual 112-1, Ch. 15, Table 15-8 and 15-17(b) (Oct. 29, 1969).
120 The Navy recovery program is outlined in Navy JAG Instruction 5800.7, Ch. XXIV
as amended by Change 22 (Oct. 1, 1970). A summary of this Chapter can be found in 32
C.F.R. §§ 757.1-.14 (1969). Between revisions of the Navy JAG Instruction, the Judge Advo-
cate keeps the various field offices abreast of new developments and changes of policy by items
inserted in OFF THE RECORD, a publication from his office containing legal information of
general interest to Navy JAG personnel. The publication is printed quarterly and numbered in
continuous sequence.
121 Within the Office of the Judge Advocate General, however, there are three separate
levels of authority, the Deputy Assistant Judge Advocate General for Litigation and Claims,
the Assistant Judge Advocate Generals, and the Judge Advocate General and his deputy.
The other services have similar staff organizations, but they do not attempt to fractionalize
authority within the offices. Thus, the Army Chief of the Litigation Division, Office of the
Judge Advocate General, exercises the full power of the Judge Advocate General as his
designee. Compare Air Force Manual 112-1, ch. 15, tables 15-6 and 15-8 (Oct. 29, 1969)
and Army Reg. 27-38, 4-31 (Jan. 15, 1969) with Navy JAG Instruction 5800.7, 2404(d).
122 Navy JAG Instruction 5800.7. 1 2401 (b). There is also centralization for the payment
of civilian medical bills in the District Medical Officer. Id. % 2403(g).
123 Id. % 2402(a). This practice is specifically authorized by the Attorney General's Regu-
lations, 28 C.F.R. § 43.1(a) (1969).
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There are two major differences between the Navy recovery program and
those of the other services. Instead of basing responsibility on the location where
medical care is rendered, the Navy bases it upon the geographical location of the
accident.1 4 The Naval Legal Officer in the District where the accident occurs and
to whom the case is assigned is called the "Action JAG Designee" ;"3 his duties
are, however, similar to the Army Recovery Judge Advocate and the Air Force
Base Judge Advocate."
There is also a notable variation in the delegation of the settlement authority.
The Action JAG Designee may settle by compromise only those claims not
exceeding $5,00..~r He has no authority to grant a waiver for the convenience
of the government or for undue hardship. Within the Navy Office of the Navy
Judge Advocate General, the Deputy Assistant Judge Advocate General for
Litigation and Claims can compromise claims for not more than $7,500,"s
and an Assistant Judge Advocate General may do the sameup to $10,000.2
9
Again, these levels do not have the authority to waive a claim. Only the Judge
Advocate General or his Deputy can settle any claim over $10,000 or waive
a claim in any amount, either for convenience of the government or for
hardship.
13 0
III. The Veterans Administration
The Veterans Administration (VA) recovery program is by far the oldest
agency recovery system within the federal government. 3 It also is the acknowl-
edged model used in drafting the Act and many of the regulations under it."2
The VA recovery program predates the Act by at least twenty years.' 33 When
the War Department was forced to give up its World War II recovery program
as a result of United States v. Standard Oil,"" the VA continued its system based
upon its regulatory provisions'35 and voluntary assignments from injured vet-
erans.'3 6 Much of this pre-Act program still remains in operation.' In the past
124 Id. 240.1 (c). The Army and Air Force use the location for treatment. See text accom-
panying note 66, supra.
125 Navy JAG Instruction 5800.7, f 2401(c) (Oct. 1, 1970).
126 As will be seen in the next paragraph, it might be more proper to say that he combines
the duties of the Army Recovery Judge Advocate and Army-area Staff Judge Advocate or the
Air Force Base Judge Advocate, Staff Judge Advocate of the general court-martial jurisdiction,
and the Staff Judge Advocate of the major command.
127 Navy JAG Instruction 5800.7 ff 2402(d) (Oct. 1, 1970).
128 Id 11 2402(b)(4).
129 Id. 2402(b)(3).
130 Id. 11 2402 (b)'(1) and 2402(d). The latter paragraph indicates that the Judge Advo-
cate General or his deputy can specifically delegate the waiver power on a case-by-case basis
to any one of the other levels. The delegation, however, must be personally done.
131 There are special provisions in other statutes allowing recovery by a specific fund which
are as old or pre-date the VA program. See, e.g., The Federal Employees Compensation Act,
5 U.S.C. §§ 8131 "(1964), which was enacted in 1916 by the Act of Sept. 7, 1916, 39 Stat. 750.
132 H.R. REP. No. 1534, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1962); S. REP. No. 1945, 87th Cong., 2d
Sess. (1962); COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES, REVIEW OF THE GOVERN-
MENT'S RIGHTS AND PRACTICES CONCERNING RECOVERY OF THE COST OF HOSPITAL AND
MEDICAL SERVICES IN NEGLIGENT THn-PARTY CASES 16 (1960) (Comptroller's Report).
133 The recovery program appears to have first been started by the addition of a recovery
provision in 38 C.F.R. § 25.6048(c) (1944) by 7 Fed. Reg. 2353 (Mar. 25, 1942).
134 332 U.S. 301 (1947).
135 38 C.F.R. § 17.48(e) (1969).
136 During fiscal year 1956, VA recovered $3,100,000; during 1957, $2,700,000; and during
1958, $2,100,000. Comptroller's Report on 16.
137 38 C.F.R. § 17.48(e) (1969). See also Opinion of the General Counsel (Op.G.C.)
27-48 and V.A. Circular 10-63-2 (Jan. 23, 1963), on file with NoTm DAszs LAwYER.
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it has actively asserted claims under the various state workmen's compensation
statutes, 3 ' and continues to do so today.'39 Until recently it was the only govern-
ment agency seeking recovery on a regular basis under both medical payments
coverage and health and accident policies.'4"
VA has adopted a simple two-step recovery system not unlike that of the
Navy. The first stage consists of the Chief Attorneys for the various VA regions
throughout the country, while the second is the General Counsel's Office in
Washington.' This simple organization is made possible, in part, by the fact
that VA claims, unlike those of the uniformed services, arise in only one way -
from the treatment of an individual in a VA hospital. VA has no obligation to
provide any beneficiary with treatment outside its own facifities.14' Normally,
the beneficiary will be a veteran who is unable to pay for the treatment of his
non-service-connected injury.4 3
The Act specifically excludes as a cognizable claim any treatment furnished
a veteran for a service-connected disability.'" As a result, there is a gap in the
recovery pattern under the Act. Where a serviceman is so severely injured that
he can no longer remain on active duty and will require extended hospitalization,
he is given a medical discharge by the uniformed services and transferred to a
VA hospital. His military service will have a claim for the care furnished prior
to the medical discharge whether it was rendered by the VA or by the service.'
However, VA will have no claim for care furnished after the discharge since
this injury is classified as a service-connected disability. 4 Certainly it was not
138 See, e.g., Brauer v. White Concrete Co., 253 Iowa 1033, 115 N.W.2d 202 (1962);
Stafford v. Pabco Products, Inc., 53 N.J. Super. 300, 147 A.2d 286 (1958); Higley v.
Schlessman, 292 P.2d 411 (Okla. 1956); Henry v. Lit Bros., 193 Pa. Super. 543, 165 A.2d
401 (1960); Whittier v. C. C. Allen, 4 F.C.R. 69 (Fla. Ind. Comm. 1959).
139 See, e.g., Atkins v. DeBree, 24 App. Div.2d 251, 265 N.Y.S.2d 307 (1965); Marshall v.
Rebert's Poultry Ranch & Egg Sales, 268 N.C. 223, 150 S.E.2d 423 (1966); Highlands Ins. Co.
v. Daniel, 410 S.W.2d 491 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967).
140 More recently other agencies have been asserting claims with rather uniform success
under the medical payments and uninsured motorist provisions. See Government Employees
Ins. Co. v. United States, 376 F.2d 836 (4th Cir. 1967); United States v. United Services
Automobile Assoc., 312 F. Supp. 1214 (D. Conn. 1970); United States v. Commercial Union
Ins. Group, 294 F. Supp. 768 (S.D.N.Y. 1969); United States v. Government Employees Ins.
Co., Civ. No. SA69CA214 (W.D. Tex. July 1, 1970); United States v. United Services Auto-
mobile Assoc., Civ. No. 1004 (M.D.Ga. June 4, 1969); United States v. Safeco Ins. Co. of
America, Civ. No. 6997 (W.D.Wash. May 19, 1967) (uninsured motorist coverage); and
United States v. United Services Automobile Assoc., Civ. No. 29031 (5th Cir., July 9, 1970)
(cert. appl.) (medical payments). See generally, Long, Government Recovery Beyond the
Federal Medical Recovery Act, 14 S. DAKOTA L. RnV. 20 (1969); Groce, The Federal Medical
Care Recovery Act and Its Side Effects, 36 INS. COUNSEL J. 259 (1969) ; Address by Edward
S. Ring, Vice President, Government Employees Insurance Company, to 30th Annual NAIIA
Convention, Portland, Oregon, May, 1967, on file with the NOTRE DAME LAWYER.
141 38 C.F.R. § 2.6(e) (1969). Unlike the Navy there are no differing levels of authority
within the General Counsel's Office in regard to waivers or compromise.
142 While there is no obligation to do so, the Veterans Administration does provide care for
non-service-connected injuries in other federal hospitals and in private hospitals under contract
to it when regular Veterans' hospitals are not available. V.A. Circular 10-63-2, 12 (Jan. 7,
1963) indicates that these costs will be recovered on the same basis as the costs for treatment
in the regular Veterans' hospitals.
143 Occasionally there is a claim for care furnished to an ineligible person admitted by
mistake or for emergency care.
144 42 U.S.C. § 2651(c) (1964). See, id., which provides that there will be no claim under
the Act for treatment of veterans when the injury is service-connected.
145 If the treatment is furnished in the Veterans Administration hospital, the military
service will have to reimburse the Veterans Administration. 38 C.F.R. § 17.62(c) (1969).
146 See note 144, supra.
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the intent of Congress to allow the tortfeasor to escape full liability where the
injury was so severe that it results in permanent disability requiring extended
hospital care. This loophole in the present Act should be eliminated by legislation.
When the Registrar of one of the VA hospitals finds whaf he believes to
be a case involving a claim under the Act, his procedure is to inform and forward
all essential information to the Chief Attorney for his region. 4. The Chief At-
torney will process the claim in a manner similar to that used by the milltary
services and will assert the claim if he deems it appropriate. The Chief Attorney
is limited, however, in handling the post-demand negotiations since he has no
authority to waive or compromise any part of a claim. 4 ' This authority has been
retained by the Chief Counsel's Office,'49 but can be delegated to the Chief
Attorney on a case-by-case basis.'5
IV. Department of Health, Education and Welfare
The Department of Health, Education and Welfare (HEW) has the
smallest recovery program in terms of both the number of cases processed and
amount collected. 5 ' Almost al the Department's claims arise out of the opera-
tion of the Public Health Service. This organization is charged with providing
care to the largest and most varied group of beneficiaries of any of the federal
agencies. Through its Indian Health Division, it provides both direct and contract
medical care to millions of American Indians. The hospitals operated by its
Hospital Division are open to injured American seamen and federal civilian
employees. Finally, through the Office of the Surgeon General, the Public Health
Service is responsible for providing its own members, those of the Coast Guard
and Coast and Geodetic Survey, and their dependents with direct hospital care,
as well as processing the bills for any treatment they receive in civilian facilities.'5 2
All of these activities generate claims under the Act.'
147 As was seen earlier, this screening by non-legal personnel has come into a great deal
of criticism because a number of potential claims are lost. The loss can be held to a minimum
by the non-legal personnel forwarding any case where there is any doubt whatsoever.
148 38 C.F.R. § 2.6(e)(4) (1969).
149 Id. § 2.6(e)(3).
150 Id. § 2.6(e)(4).
151 During 1968 the Department of Justice reports that the Department of Health, Educa-
tion, and Welfare handled 752 claims and recovered $169,578.22. During the same period, the
Army asserted 3,153 claims and recovered $1,806,466.21, while the Air Force had a net recov-
ery of $1,361,402.80 from 4,089 claims. See, 28 C.F.R. § 43.4 (1969) and letter from Joseph C.
Long to Harry L. Henning, Aug. 3, 1970, on file with the NoTRE DAME LAWYER.
152 In addition, the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare operates the Freedman's
Hospital in Washington, D.C. Public Health Service General Circular No. 6 and Coast Guard
Instruction No. G320.2s (Feb. 13, 1967). 42 C.F.R. §§ 31.2, 32.6, 36.12 (1969). "
153 The Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2651(a) '(1964), specifically excludes a claim being made
against the employers of seamen who receive treatment under 42 U.S.C. § 249 (1964). For
the background of this exemption see, Letter from Joseph Campbell, Comptroller General, to
Honorable Emanuel Celler, Chairman, Committee on the Judiciary, House of Representatives,
Aug. 2, 1961, attached to H. REP. No. 1534, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 15 (1962); 2 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 2651-54 (1962). Recovery can be made under the Act, however, where
the injury was the result of the negligence of some third party such as a stevedoring company.
As outlined earlier, supra note 4, normally the treatment given injured federal employees is
paid for by the Employees Compensation Fund and recovery is under that Act. 5 U.S.C.A. §
8131-32 (1964). When care is rendered by the Public Health Service, however, there is no
reimbursement by the Fund and the Health Service recovers under the Act. Dept. of Health,
Education, and Welfare, Manual for Processing Hospital and Medical Care Claims, Part A,
§ 5(a) (Jan. 1965) (Hereinafter Manual).
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To handle these claims, HEW uses a two-stage recovery organization very
similar to that of the VA and the Navy. The first of these levels consists of
regional counsels for the nine HEW regional offices," while the second is the
Business and Administrative Law Division of the General Counsel's Office.'"5
As is the case with VA, this centralization of authority has forced HEW to
depend heavily upon non-legal personnel to perform many of the tasks done
by the judge advocates in the case of the military recovery programs. The
attending physician has the responsibility of screening the cases and making the
initial determination of whether a claim is cognizable under the Act.'56 Like-
wise, someone at the treatment center will interview the patient, advise him of
the government's interest,'57 and take a detailed statement concerning the ac-
cident and any information known by the injured party about the alleged
tortfeasor 5 s
When this procedure is completed, the statement is transmitted to the
Regional Counsel. He will review the initial determinations, make any further
investigations,' and assert the claim if he deems it to be appropriate. As in
the case of the other agencies, the Regional Counsel has restricted authority to
compromise or waive claims. He may compromise or waive, either for the con-
venience of the government or because of undue hardship on the injured party,
any claim not exceeding $2,500."0
V. Department of Justice
The last agency meriting discussion is the Department of Justice. Under
the Attorney General's Regulations, 1 ' the Department is charged with overall
coordination of the recovery programs conducted by the various agencies. This
function is handled through the Torts Branch of the Civil Division'l which
sets the general policy for the recovery program and has direct control over any
claim involving more than $20,000.' Until the Attorney General's Regulations
were amended in 1967, ' every case that was referred to a United States At-
torney by one of the processing agencies passed through this office. Under the
154 33 Fed. Reg. 5694, § 2-300.50-2 (1968), amending 32 Fed. Reg. 5813 (1967).
155 Id. at 5714, § 2-300.50-1 (1968), amending 32 Fed. Reg. 5813 (1967).
156 In order to avoid some of the problems that the other agencies have had in allowing
non-legal trained personnel to screen potential claims, the Department has published an ex-
cellent guide for use by its lay personnel, outlining examples of tort liability and when claims
should and should not be reported. See Manual.
157 At this same time the interviewer will ask the patient to sign PHS Form 4686, Agree-
ment to Assign Claim upon Request. See note 85, supra, for a discussion of assignments. If the
patient refuses to sign, the Health Service will withhold his medical records. Manual, Part C,
§ 3 and Part D, § 1(a).
158 This statement will be recorded on PHS Form 4278, Third Party Report. Where the
care is rendered by a contract hospital, this facility is furnished with a "third-party kit" and
requested to perform the same duties as the attending physician and interviewer. Manual,
Part C, § 7. Normally this only happens in the Division of Indian Health.
159 The interviewer is not required to make an extensive investigation beyond interviewing
the injured party and members of his immediate family who might be present. Manual, Part
C, § 3.
160 33 Fed. Reg. 5694, § 2-300.50-2 (1968), amending 32 Fed. Reg. 5813 '(1967).
161 28 C.F.R. §§ 43.1-.4 (1969).
162 See id. § 0.45(g).
163 Id. § 43.3(b).
164 Id. § 43.3 (1967), as amended 28 C.F.R. § 43.3 (1969).
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present regulation, only those cases involving unusual circumstances, such as
recovery from the injured party or his attorney, a new point of law,, or a case
involving substantial differences in policies between the agencies, need to be
cleared.16 The remaining cases can be sent by the processing agency directly to
the appropriate United States Attorney.
The United States Attorneys are charged with supervising all litigation in
which the United States is a party. The Department of Justice, however, recently
authorized its Attorneys to accept assistance from the legal personnel of the
various other enforcement agencies."6 6 As a result, in a number of cases, Army
Judge Advocates have prepared trial briefs and represented the United States
Attorney in various negotiations and hearings.6 7 The author, however, knows
of only one dcided case where the government was represented by an Army
Judge Advocate officer. This case was Marshall v. Cuttrell,"'6 which was handled
by Captain Frank D. Hill, staff Judge Advocate's office, Ft. Sill, Oklahoma.
Captain Hill further indicates that he has participated in one other case in which
the decision is pending'6 9
The extent to which legal personnel from the other agencies will be used
is up to the individual United States Attorney. The arrangement was made in
an attempt to ease the burden imposed upon the Attorneys by the Act and to
facilitate representation in cases to be tried at some distance from their main
offices. It should be remembered, however, when enforcement agency personnel
are acting in this manner, they are under the supervision and control of the
United States Attorney.' Once a case has been turned over to an Attorney,
the referring agency loses control over it. Any further negotiations would be
under his supervision, and he is the proper recipient of settlement offers.
The United States Attorneys have limited settlement authority. They may
compromise or waive for the convenience of the government any claim not in
excess of $5,000Y.' In claims above this amount they must receive prior approval
from the Torts Branch. The United States Attorney has no power to grant a
waiver for undue hardship to the injured party
7 2
165 Id. § 43.3(d) (1969).
166 28 U.S.C. § 547 (Supp. II, 1966). Whether the United States Attorney will have to
make an appearance in a case brought by the injured party's attorney under the unofficial
collection procedure is an open question which will be discussed in the last half of the article.
See text following note 173, infra.
167 Letter from William D. Ruckelshaus, Assistant Attorney General, Civil Division to
Torts Branch, Litigation Division, Office of the Judge Advocate General, Department of the
Army, July 9, 1969, on file with the NOTRE DAME LAWYER.
168 Civil No. 70-254 (W.D. Okla., Aug. 4, 1970).
169 Such appearances by enforcement agency personnel, with or without an accompanying
appearance by the United States Attorney, can be questioned in light of the Justice Depart-
ment's interpretation of 5 U.S.C. § 3106 (Supp. II, 1966), limiting representation of the
United States in court actions to the Attorney-General, members of his staff, or the United
States Attorneys. See text accompanying note 179, infra. The propriety of the wide-spread
practice of basing private attorney's fees on the gross amount of the settlement or judgment
when the government's medical claim is included will be discussed in text at note 179, infra.
170 Judge Advocate General, U.S. Army, Federal Medical Care Recovery Act Letter No.
469, Aug. 20, 1969, on fie with the NOTRE DAME LAWYER.
171 28 C.F.R. App. to Subpt. W, memo no. 374, § 3E(1) (1969). This authority is re-
stricted where there is an objection by the agency initiating the claim. Id. §§ 4-5. The United
States Attorney's authority to settle is further restricted to accepting settlements which fairly
reflect the litigative probability of the case, regardless of the problems that might be involved.
Id. § 6.
172 See id. §§ 4-6.
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VI. Unofficial Collection Procedure
Besides the official collection procedure outlined above, there has grown
up a very important unofficial procedure. All of the government agencies are now
including in their initial advice to persons whose injuries may result in third-
party claims a request for the name and address of any counsel who is represent-
ing them in an attempt to recover for their injuries."" When this information is
received, the agency will send counsel a contact letter requesting him in essence
to include the government's claim along with that of his client's in any settlement
negotiations or litigation that he may undertake.""
This practice is not recognized in the Act itself, nor does it seem to have
been contemplated in the legislative history." 5 At least one author has questioned
the propriety of its use.' The practice seems to have first begun about a year
after the effective date of the Act, and probably as a result of the Armed Services
173 The injured party is advised of the government's interest and that he has a duty to
cooperate with the government and to furnish a statement about the accident. He is also told
that he should not sign any release of his claim or give the third party or his insurance company
a statement without first notifying the claims officer. See e.g., Air Force Manual 112-1, 1
15-11(b) (2) (Oct. 29, 1969).
174 Air Force Manual 112-1, Ch. 15, fig. 15-3 (Oct. 29, 1969) offers the following sample:
Dear ............................
This office has been advised that you represent ....................... in a
personal injury matter.
As you may know, under the Federal Medical Care Recovery Act (42 U.S.C.
2651-2653) the United States has the right to recover from any third party liable
therefor, the reasonable value of medical care furnished or to be furnished. Although
the United States is entitled to proceed separately and directly against a third-party
tort-feasor for this purpose, it has proven to be mutually beneficial for the United
States to assert its claim through the injured party's attorney. This procedure will
permit you to retain control of settlement negotiations and litigation except that you
may not settle the claim of the United States for less than the full amount demanded
without the express approval of this office. Also, the Air Force will cooperate with
you in obtaining essential Government medical records and available expert medical
witnesses at no cost to you or your client. This Government support and cooperation
will be provided in lieu of payment of counsel fees by the United States on that
portion of your recovery which represents the United States' claim due to the prohi-
bition contained in 5 U.S.C. 3106.
The present amount of the United States' claim, based on Bureau of Budget
rates, is $ .......-. ----..... --_-
It is requested, therefore, that on the terms and conditions stated above you
agree to assert the claim of the United States, and that, should suit be initiated, you
include in your demand as an item of special damages the amount of the United
States' claim as stated above, subject to future medical care. The following allegation
in your pleading will accomplish this purpose: "As a result of said injuries, the
plaintiff has received (and in the future will continue to receive) medical and
hospital care and treatment furnished by the United States of America. The plaintiff,
for the sole use and benefit of the United States of America under the provisions of
42 U.S.C. 2651-2653, and with its express consent, asserts a claim for the reasonable
value of said (past and future) care and treatment."
If this arrangement is acceptable to you and your client, I would appreciate your
acknowledgment thereof by letter reply at your earliest convenience using the en-
closed, self-addressed franked envelope.
Sincerely,
175 H. REP. No. 1534, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. (1962); S. REP. No. 1945, 87th Cong., 2d
Sess. (1962); COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES, REVIEW OF THE GOVERN-
MENT'S RIGHTS AND PRACTICES CONCERNING RECOVERY OF THE COST OF HOSPITAL AND
MEDICAL SERVICES IN NEGLIGENT THIRD-PARTY CASES (1960).
176 Cassady, The Federal Medical Care Recovery Act and Private Attorneys (April, 1968)
(unpublished thesis in the Judge Advocate General's School Library) [hereinafter cited as
Cassady].
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failing to provide additional personnel to implement the collection program.'7 7
It has grown so common-today that in terms of cases handled it vastly over-
shadows the official collection process.7 8
While the success of this unofficial procedure, in terms of the number of
private lawyers willing to represent the government, has been great, there have
been numerous problems.
A. Paynent of Fee
The most frustrating problem to the practicing attorney is the government's
insistence on an inability to reimburse counsel for representing its interests.
The Act makes no provision for fee payment to civilian counsel. The various
government agencies have uniformly taken the position that they are prevented
from paying attorneys' fees by statute.' The authorities who have considered
the question are in agreement with the government's position.8 0 This position,
however, does not withstand careful analysis.
The government's position rests on an interpretationof former section 314
of title 5 of the United States Code. That section provided, in part:
No compensation shall be allowed to any person, besides the respective
United States attorneys and assistant United States attorneys for services
as an attorney or counselor to the United States, or to any branch or de-
partment of the Government thereof, except on cases specially authorized
by law.' 8 '
Coupling the language of this section with that of former section 306, the
agencies conclude, on the basis of Richter v. United States, 2 that they are
prohibited from paying a fee for representation by private counsel under any
circumstances.
In Richter, the plaintiff, a lawyer, had been retained by a railroadman
to recover for injuries sustained on the job. The attorney had been successful
177 See Letter, Robert C. Fable, Jr., General Counsel, Veterans Administration, to Chief
Attorneys, Regibnal Offices, Mar. 23, 1964, on file with the NOTEE DAME LAwYER. Paragraph
9 states ,that the practice of collection through private attorneys was part of the Department
of Justice's policy under the Act. See also AFJAG REPTr. 23, item I (1964) and AFJAG
REPTR.. 11 (1966) on file with the NOTRE DAME LAwYER.
178 While no government-wide figures are available, the Navy Department estimates that
seventy percent of its administrative collections were made through negotiations handled by
private attorneys. Cassady at 15. . I ' -
179 5 U.S.C. § 3106 (Supp. II; 1966).
180 See e.g., Noone, May Plaintiffs Include the United States' Claim Under, the Federal
Medical Care Recovery Act Without Government Intervention? 10 AF JAG L. REv. 20.- 21
'(1968); Dingfelder, The Federal Medical Care Recovery Act-Today, 1968 INs. L. J. 853, 864.
181 An Act to Establish the Department of Justice, ch. 150, §§ 14, 17, 16 Stat. 164 (1870);
as amended, ch. 1263, § 11, 68 STAT. 1229 (1944), as amended, ch. 646, § 1, 62 Stat. 909
(1948), as amended § 7(b), 72 Stat. 1555 (1958), as amended 5 U.S.C. § 3106 (Supp. II,
1966). The wording of this section was changed during the general revision of Title 5 in 1966,
and the section was renumbered section 3106. It provides: .
[T]he head of an executive department or military department may not employ an
attorney or counsel for the conduct of litigation in which the United States, an
agency, or employee thereof is a party, or is interested, or for the securing of evidence
therefor, but shall refer the matter to the Department of Justice ....
The agencies have treated the change in the language as insignificant as far as the prohibition
is concerned.
182 Richter v. United States, 190 F.Supp. 159 (E.D. Pa. 1960), aff'd 296 F.2d 509 (3d
Cir. 1961), cert. denied 369 U.S. 828 (1962).
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in securing a substantial settlement; however, from the gross recovery, the govern-
ment demanded and received reimbursement for the payments made to the
injured party under the Railroad Unemployment Insurance Act."8 3 The lawyer
took a portion of his contingent fee from the remainder and filed suit under the
Tucker Act,' claiming the remainder fee for representing the government's
interests. He based his demand on those provisions of the Tucker Act which give
the federal district courts jurisdiction over claims against the government arising
out of an implied or express contract or based upon an act of Congress.8 5 The
court first concluded that the Railroad Unemployment Insurance Act (like the
Federal Medical Care Recovery Act) makes no provision for the payment of
legal fees and, therefore, jurisdiction could not be founded on that portion of the
statute dealing with acts of Congress. 8 ' Noting the lack of any allegation of an
express contract, the court considered the possibility of an implied contract. It
first pointed out that the Tucker Act only encompasses contracts implied in fact
and not those implied in law.'8 7 It then held that no such implied in fact contract
was involved here because:
in the instant case, there are no facts alleged in the complaint from which
assent can be inferred. In fact, the complaint alleges no direct relationship
whatsoever between the plaintiffs and the United States or the Railroad
Retirement Board.' 8
The court continued:
[A]n attorney cannot seek to have a contract implied in fact as against
the Government when he has been representing a private client under
a separate bilateral agreement and was acting solely in his behalf. Any
benefit which might be received by the Government is purely incidental....
The rule generally is that each litigant must pay his own counsel fees
and that an attorney cannot make another party - who receives an in-
direct benefit - his debtor by voluntarily rendering services in his behalf
without his express or implied assent. 18 9
Had the court stopped here, there would be little or no confusion over its
holding, but the court went on by the way of dicta to examine former sections
306, 314 and 315 which dealt with the appointment of special attorneys. First,
from its reading of section 306, the court concluded that "only the Attorney
General or the United States Attorney could represent the government in an
action in court."'"" Then, examining section 314, it noted that payment of legal
fees was limited to these officers, except for special attorneys appointed under
section 315, after certification by the Attorney General that the work had
183 45 U.S.C. §§ 351-67 (1964).
184 28 U.S.C. § 1346 (1964).
185 Id. § 1346 (a)(2).
186 190 F.Supp. at 161.
187 Id. This is still true. See, e.g., Knight Newspapers, Inc. v. United States, 395 F.2d 353
(6th Cir. 1968).
188 190 F. Supp. at 162.
189 Id. at 163.
190 Id.
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actually been performed.""1 These two facts led the court to rule that there
could be no implied in fact contract in this case because:
[O]nly the Attorney General has the authority to make a contract for
the special employment of an attorney. Furthermore no attorney can receive
counsel fees from the Government except on receipt of the certification of
the Attorney General that such services were actually performed. There
is no allegation in the complaint of the receipt of such a certificate.1
92
Without the confusing dicta, the import of Richter is quite clear and simple.
It merely decides no matter how equitable the lawyer's claim to a fee may be,
in the absence of an express contract or agreement between the lawyer and the
government, the lawyer's claim is procedurally uncognizable under the Tucker
Act. 9 Congress in- passing the Tucker Act waived the government's sovereign
immunity only in cases involving contracts implied in fact not those implied in
law. Without prior agreement, any claim by the attorney would have to be
based on equitable considerations with the courts creating the obligation as a
matter of law. This the courts have no jurisdiction to do under the Tucker Act.
Richter does not say, however, that such an implied in law contract is not
possible if some other jurisdictional basis for suit against the government can
be established. This procedural interpretation of the Tucker Act was recently
upheld in United States v. Nation,' decided under the Federal Medical Care
Recovery Act.
Nation goes far beyond Richter's procedural construction of the Tucker Act
and seems to close all avenues to recovery where there has been no contact. In
Nation, an action had been filed in a state court without prior co-ordination
with the government. This suit was settled for $8,000. The release given by the
injured party specifically indicated this sum included a recovery of the govern-
ment's medical costs. The government later sued the tortfeasor. The tortfeasor
impleaded the injured party, relying on the terms of the release. The injured party
deposited the disputed amount with the court. His attorney objected, arguing that
he was entitled to a fee from the government for recovering the medical expenses.
His demand was based on the same equitable concept used in Richter - that
he had created the fund from which the government's recovery was derived.
The Richter court characterized the government's rights under the Railroad
Unemployment Act as a lien or subrogated claim.' 95 The Nation court, however,
identified the government's right under the Act as an independent statutory right,
separate and apart from the injured party's claim.'6 If, therefore, the govern-
ment does not consent to, or in any way participate in, the creation of the fund,
191 Id. at 164. Such appointment cannot be retroactive. Lee v. United States, 45 Ct. Cl.
57 (1910).
192 190 F.Supp. at 164.
193 28 U.S.C. § 1346 (1964).
194 United States v. Nation, 299 F.Supp 266 (N.D. Okla. 1969).
195 45 U.S.C. § 362(o) (1964). The provision reads in part:
Upon notice to the person against whom such right or claim exists or is asserted,
the Board shall have a lien upon such right or claim, any judgment obtained there-
under, and any sum or damages paid under such right or claim....
196 See e.g., United States v. Merrigan, 389 F.2d 21 (3d Cir. 1968); and United States
v. Fort Benning Rifle and Pistol Club, 387 F.2d 884 (5th Cir. 1967).
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as it did not in Nation, the attorney would be a volunteer and, as such, not en-
titled to any fee.
If Richter and Nation are controlling, the attorney will not be able to
recover a fee unless he can establish a prior agreement between himself and the
government. As was seen earlier, this is not the case.' The protection of the
government's claim is normally the result of direct contact by an enforcement
agency. The Army contact letter specifically requires the attorney to agree
in writing on the bottom of the letter to represent the government's interest.
The other agencies merely require an affirmative reply. Clearly then, there
is an explicit agreement between the lawyer and the government. The agreement,
however, has specific language which negates any payment of a fee.
The effect of a lawyer's self-help remedy of withholding his fee in the face
of the agreement when transmitting the settlement was tested in United States
v. Kapelus 9 s The Navy, in that case, had contacted Kapelus, who was rep-
resenting an injured serviceman. Kapelus agreed in writing to include, and did
include, the government's claim in his negotiations. When a settlement was
reached, the government sent Kapelus a release in favor of the tortfeasor. Kapelus
received the settlement check, deducted a portion of his fee and transmitted the
remainder of the government's claim to the Navy.' The Navy demanded the
remainder of the claim, and when Kapelus refused, it sued to recover the fee.
The district court held that section 3106200 prevents the payment of a fee
and that the attorney had freely accepted this interpretation of the statute when
he agreed to represent the government's interests under the conditions of the
original contact letter."' He was therefore a volunteer and the government was
allowed to recover. 0 2
This brings us in a full circle and back to the original question. Does the
language of the statutes really compel the agencies' position? A careful analysis
of this question is essential, since Kapelus and Nation indicate that the attorney
is at the mercy of the agencies as long, as the agencies continue to include
language specifically negating fee payment in their contact letters.
Upon hasty examination, it appears that Kapelus and Richter seem to
197 See text at note 193, supra.
198 United States v. Kapelus, Civil No. 68-141-F (C.D. Cal., Apr. 30, 1968).
199 Id. at 3. The entire problem in this case could have been avoided by the Navy insisting
that separate checks be made out by the tortfeasor. In this case, as in many cases, however,
such a procedure may not have been possible since there seems to have been a lump sum
settlement. In such a case, the exact division between the government and the injured party
is left to be worked out by the parties themselves. See text following note 223, infra, for a
discussion of the problems involved in such a practice. Another case, Hughes v. Sanders,
287 F.Supp. 332 (E.D. Okla. 1968) indicates that the defendant has no right to object if a
settlement is made or a judgment entered against him which includes the government's claim
and the government upon request of the plaintiff waives all or part of its claim. In the case
of a lump sum settlement, some protection can be afforded the government by requiring the
check from the tortfeasor to be made out in the name of the government and the injured party
jointly, and then have the injured party indorse the check first. If, at a later date, the
government wishes to waive its claim, it can deposit the check and issue a government check
in payment. See Cohip. GEN. Dac. B-157663 (Oct. 12, 1965) (unpublished) on file with the
NOTRE DAME LAWYER. Such a requirement might be distasteful to some judge advocates as it
could be interpreted as a lack of faith by the government in the civilian attorney.
200 5 U.S.C. § 3106 (Supp. III, 1968).
201 Civil No. 68-141-F at 3 (C.D. Calif. Apr. 30, 1968).
202 Id.
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support the government's position. Kapelus, however, does not carry the weight
one might suppose and can quickly be discounted. It is a memorandum decision
which cites no authority for its position and contains no discussion of the statutes
involved. Further, while it clearly held that section 3106203 prevented the pay-
ment of attorneys' fees, the court also held that Kapelus had accepted this in-
terpretation of the statute by agreeing to the terms of the initial contact letter.
It is submitted that the acceptance by Kapelus. is a much stronger basis for the
decision.
The dicta in Richter cannot be as quickly discounted. The key, however,
is not what the court said but what it assumed. Richter said that only the Attorney
General or a United States Attorney, either regular or special, could represent
the United States in court and be paid for doing so. This is a fair interpretation
of the intent of the former sections,' 4 and this intent becomes quite clear upon
reading the revised section.20 5
The extent of the prohibition against private counsel lies in the meaning
of "conduct of, or securing evidence for litigation," -used in both of the new
sections. The government relies on Richter'as authority for interpreting these
words to be at least as broad as "representing the United States in court" as used
in Richter. No one would question that the new sections and Richter both pro-
hibit the use and payment of a private attorney in actual courtroom proceedings
where the United States or one of its agencies or officers was a named party. 06
But does the prohibition extend beyond the. actual conduct of litigation in the
courtroom? The Richter court appears to make the assumption that it does,
and the government has seized upon this conclusion as the basis for the language
in' the contact letters. The facts in Richter reveal that the attorney did not have to
sue. The case was settled. 0 ' Therefore, the court, in barring the recovery by the
attorney, equated the representation of the United States in negotiations toward
settlement short of court action with representation of the United States in
actual litigation and, in effect, held that these functions are reserved for the
Attorney General or a United States Attoiney,, either regular or special. The
invalidity of the assumption as to negotiations can quickly be seen from an
203, 5 U.S.C. § 3106 (Supp. I1, 1968).
204 See note 181, supra. Section 306 technically only prohibited such representation in the
Supreme Court and Court of Claims. The statute reads:
[S]hall . . . conduct, prosecute, or defend all suits and proceedings in the Supreme
Court and in the Court of Claims ....
If "shall" were taken in its imperative sense, representations in all other courts would be
voluntary and could therefore give rise to a claim for compensation.
205 See note 181, supra.
206 Since the statutes go further and prohibit both the -use and payment of private at-
torneys where the United States, its officers, or agencies, "is interested"-in the litigation, there
is a very difficult question as to whether or not a private attorney can represent the govern-
ment's interest by the inclusion of the suggested allegation in the complaint of the injured
party's suit. 5 U.S.C. § 3106 (Supp. I1, 1968); 28 U.S.C. § 516 (Supp. II, 1966). See note
174, supra, for the suggested allegation.
207 The same is true in both United States v. Kapelus, Civil No. 68-141-F (C.D. Calif.
Apr. 30, 1968) and United States v. Nation, 299 F. Supp. 266 (N.D. Okla. 1969), although,
in both these cases, suit had -been filed. Where suit has been filed, the problem arises as to
whether from that pojnt on the United States attorney must handle the case. This should not
however, be too great a problem since Roseberg and Sovern, Delay and the Dynamics o
Personal Injury Litigation, 59 COLUm. L. Rv. 1116, 1124 (1959) report that 65% of all
personal injury suits are settled prior to trial and Cassady, at 6,: reports that 90 to 95% of
Medical Recovery claims are settled out of cotirt.
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examination of the organization of the various enforcement departments and
agencies. These bodies employ literally hundreds of lawyers both civilian and
military to represent them in direct negotiations with the tortfeasors and their in-
surance companies. For example, the Navy Department has estimated that thirty
percent of the claims it collects under the Act are the result of direct negotiation
by its personnel."' If the Richter assumption is correct, then it would appear that
the agencies are constantly violating the statutory prohibition. If, as Richter
seems to say, only the Attorney General or a United States Attorney can rep-
resent the government, then there is no room for agency exceptions.
Such a drastic interpretation of the statute might have been justified under
the language of former section 306, which specifically required the various de-
partment heads to seek counsel from the Department of Justice on all legal
matters. 9 Such a system may have been workable when the statute was originally
enacted in 1871, but department heads have long since ceased to rely on the
Department of Justice for legal advice and now retain their own staff counsel.
This practice was well-known to Congress when the language requiring consul-
tation was omitted when section 306 was rewritten and renumbered as section
516.210
The interpretation urged by the government would reduce the function of
the various agencies under the Act to the securing and compiling of background
data for claims. Conceivably, even this limited function might be a violation
of the Act, since it prohibits the securing of evidence for litigation.2 1' This would
place the entire burden of investigating, negotiating, and suing on the claim,
if necessary, upon the Department of Justice. Clearly such an interpretation was
not contemplated by the Act" or regulations issued by the Attorney General, 1
nor could it have been contemplated by the various agencies when they pro-
mulgated regulations under the Act requiring the exhaustion of administrative
collection procedures within the departments prior to the forwarding of any
case to the Department of Justice.
The question, then, is not whether sections 3106 and 516 (formerly section
306) prohibit the use and payment of counsel other than the Attorney General or
the United States Attorney in the negotiation stages prior to the filing of suit,21 4
but it is whether other statutes prohibit the use of private attorneys on a part-time,
case-by-case basis, rather than the use of full-time civil service or military counsel.
One author has suggested that section 5502"'5 is such a statute;" but a close read-
ing of this section reveals that it merely prohibits payment to a person claiming to
208 Cassady, at 15.
209 This section reads in part:
The officers of the Department of Justice . . . shall give all opinions and render all
services requiring the skill of persons learned in the law necessary to enable . . . heads
of Departments . . . to discharge their respective duties. 5 U.S.C. § 306 (1964).
210 28 U.S.C.A. § 516 (1968) (Reviser's Explanatory Note).
211 Cf. Cassady.
212 42 U.S.C. § 2652(b) (1964) contemplates compromise and waiver by the various
agency heads.
213 28 G.F.R. § 43.3 '(1969) contains a specific delegation of waiver and compromise
authority to the agency heads. These agency heads have further delegated the authority. See
e.g., Army Reg. 27-38, 4-3 (Jan. 15, 1969).
214 Id. 4-5.
215 5 U.S.C. § 5502 (1964).
216 Noone, May Plaintiffs Include the United States' Claim Under the Federal Medical
[Winter, 1971]
FEDERAL MEDICAL CARE RECOVERY ACT
hold an office or position which does not legally exist. It does not resolve the
question whether such offices presently exist or can be legally created by the
various department heads to which the private attorneys can be appointed. The
problem does not seem too different from that presented by the use of non-
government, part-time consultants, which seem to be used in profusion throughout
the government and which are presumably paid.
While the government may still adhere to its official position and lament
the woes of its "volunteer" attorneys,"'7 the true test should be in seeking an
opinion from the Comptroller General or in an attempt by an agency to secure
counsel without the restrictive clause in the agreement letter, thereby opening
the way for a court testL.2 Without a more definitive position by the government
or the courts, the present structure can only continue to frustrate the profession.
B. Alternative Means of Obtaining Fee Payment
1. APPOINTMENT AS SPECIAL UNITED STATES ATTORNEY
Should the above approach fail, either as a result of an adverse decision
as to the ability to hire legal counsel or because of a lack of authority to hire
consultants, all is not lost. Richter suggests another approach to this problem.
Section 314 of the former statutes 19 provides that the Attorney General is
authorized to appoint special Assistant United States Attorneys "when the public
interest so requires." There would seem to be no legal objection to the appoint-
ment of private counsel as special Assistant United States Attorneys on a case-
by-case basis.
220
While there is no legal reason why this cannot be done, there are a number
of factors which make this method a definite second choice to direct employ-
ment by the agency affected. The most obvious problem is that these appoint-
ments must be made directly by the Attorney General. This would require
the enforcement agency claims officer to promptly notify the Department of
Justice. Since direct contact with the Department of Justice is not authorized
from the field level, this would greatly increase the amount of administrative
work at the agency staff level. Further, it is understood that it is the present policy
of the Department of Justice not to make such a special appointment without
a security clearance by the FBI. With the large number of claims that are
being processed by private attorneys under the present administrative set-up,
such appointments would create insurmountable problems.
Care Recovery Act Without Government Intervention? 10 AF JAG L. Rnv. 20, 21 (1968)
[hereinafter cited as Noone].
217 The use of experts and consultants is controlled by 5 U.S.C. § 3109 (Supp. II, 1966).
Boyle v. United States, 309 F.2d 399 (Ct. C.1962) makes it clear that attorneys can be hired
under this section. This provision is not, however, the final word as it only applies when the
agency head is authorized by other statutes or appropriations to hire these consultants. The
basic authority to hire consultants, therefore, must be found elsewhere. For example, the
General Services Administration has such authority in 40 U.S.C. § 758 (Supp. II, 1966).
218 A sample of the letter may be found at note 174, supra.
219 This section is now 28 U.S.C. § 542 '(Supp. II, 1966).




Even if these administrative difficulties could be overcome by a simplified
process of appointment, there is one other major drawback from the practicing
lawyer's point of view. As a special Assistant United States Attorney, the private
counsel would be under the control and supervision of the Attorney General in
the conduct of the case so far as the government's claim is concerned. Most private
attorneys are not willing to surrender control over the practical aspects of the
case. Avoidance of government interference and control is often one of the
prime reasons for taking on the additional burden of representing the govern-
ment's interest. To submit to this control as a special Assistant United States
Attorney would be to lose any advantage gained by such representation.
Therefore, while appointment as a special Assistant United States Attorney
remains as a legal means to pay counsel for representing the government's
interest, its practical usefulness is greatly limited by the present administrative
procedure. This device should be considered only if other suggested alternatives
fail and the pressure for the payment of fees becomes unbearable.
2. STATUTORY AMENDMENT
The most obvious way to overcome the inequity of no fee payment would
be to amend the Act to include a provision specifically authorizing such pay-
ments. At least one attempt to amend the statute has been made. On March
23, 1965, H.R. 6642 was introduced in the House of Representatives.22' This
bill would have amended the first section of the Act to include a clause allowing
the employment of, and payment of a pro rata fee of up to twenty-five percent
of the government's claim to the injured party's counsel for representing the
government's interests in any case which the United States either joined or
intervened. 2  This bill would not, however, help the lawyer in most situa-
tions - since most cases are settled by negotiation prior to suit. Any new pro-
posed legislation should make provision for payment of a fee regardless of
whether the suit goes to trial or is settled at any stage by negotiation. This fact
should then be made clear to the lawyer at the time he agrees to handle the
government's claim. Such a change would also preclude an ethical conflict
between the government's desire to settle and the lawyer's interest in seeing that
it go to trial so that he can collect his fee.
Likewise, future legislation should make it clear that the statute will apply
regardless of the form in which the United States participates. H.R. 6642
was subject to the interpretation that payment is to be forthcoming only if, the
United States joins or intervenes as a party plaintiff. This should be clarified to
include payment when the United States attempts to assert its claim through
the injured party without being named as a party plaintiff.
3. PAssnN THE FEE ON TO THE INJURED PARTY
Assuming that under the present circumstances no fee can be collected
from the government, can the cost of handling the government's interest be
221 111 CoNG. Rnc. 5719.
222 42 U.S.C. § 2651(b) (1954).
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passed on to the injured party by basing the contingent fee upon the gross
recovery before deducting the government's share? This practice is presently
widespread,2 ' but presents a difficult ethical problem.
The Act creates a separate and distinct cause of action on the part of the
government, completely independent of the injured party's interest.224 It can
be argued that to charge the injured party for collection of the government's
claim would be improper. It would be akin to charging one client the entire
fee where the lawyer represented two separate clients in an action for injuries
arising out of the same accident.
This analysis has led one author to conclude that such a fee arrangement
is unethical.225 But even if we assume that such an agreement is not unethical
per se (on the theory that the client is free to contract as he pleases for fee
payment), the lawyer owes his client a duty to fully and completely disclose his
intention to base his fee on the gross recovery and to secure a specific and in-
telligently executed consent to such arrangement.2 26 Mere knowledge on the
part of the injured party may not be enough to protect him.
The injured party may, however, find that he is unable to secure rep-
resentation of his interest unless he agrees to a fee calculated in this manner.
Realizing the problems presented here, the Army, in order to protect its members
'from a-situation not of their own making,22 specifically requires2 that the-at-
torney agree in writing at the time he accepts the obligation of representing the
government that his fee from the injured party will not be based on the amount
of the government's claim.229
. One good argument to the contrary is that the government's claim should
be treated like any other medical expense. In the case of ordinary -hospital or
doctor bills, the client has incurred a contractual obligation to pay the bills, but
he is entitled to pass thdse costs on to the tortfeasor in the form of special dam-
ages."3 ' The calculation of attorney's fee under these circumstances involves no
223 Cassady, at 21, 48.
224 See note 196, supra. In Irby v. Government Employees Ins. Co., 175 So.2d 9 (La. App.
1965) the court said:
Two distinct and separate claims were involved in the settlements made with the
tort-feasor and his insurer. One was the government's claim for medical and hospital
.services; the other was plaintiff's claim for personal injuries. The understanding
between the government and the plaintiff's attorney was that the latter Would process
th6 government's claim for the government, I.E., forward the government's, release
to the tort-feasor's insurer with directions to that insurer to issue a draft drawn to
the order of the proper governmental department. Thus, in connection with the
"$312 settlement for medical and hospital expenses, plaintiff's attorney was acting
for the government and not for the plaintiff. Id. at 11.
225 Casiady at 47.
226 Cassady argues that to do otherwise is a breach of the fee contract. Id. at 48. In many
cases this notice requirement may involve a renegotiation of the fee agreement at the time
the government's interest becomes apparent since the original fee arrangement often will be
made before the government's interest is -known.
227 True, the problem arose as a result of their acceptance of government medical care,
but they are entitled to this care in any event, and probably did not consider-the consequences
of such acceptance at the time the care was rendered.
228 Army Reg. 27-38, 11 4.-1(b) (Jan. 15, 1969). -
229 The Navy takes the same position but does not require a written agreement. See Navy
contact letter, reprinted in Cassady at 16-19.
230 In some states the bills if unpaid are a lien upon the recovery. See e.g., TEx. REv.
Cxv STAT. ANw. art. 5506 (a). Fori, Hospital Recovery - An Additional Tool,, 12 -AF JAG L.
Rv. -158 (1970) suggests that Judge Advocates consider using these statutes to recover when,
for some reason, recovery cannot be had under the Act.. - * .
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deduction for these bills; the fee is based on the gross amount recovered. The
Air Force seems to approve of this approach231 when it states that the question
of fee paid by the injured party is a matter of private contract between the
injured party and private counsel and of no concern to the Air Force.
The obvious problem with this approach is that it ignores the separate,
statutorily based, legal status of the government's claim. Under the ordinary
case, the entire claim is the client's indivisible cause of action with the hospital
or doctor at best having only a statutory lien upon the recovery. This is not
true of the government's claim.232 Should the technical legal description of the
government's claim govern the practical method of calculating the attorney's fee?
This is a great, unanswered question which can only be resolved by the good
judgment of individual lawyer and the various local bar associations.
Fee payment will remain one of the most difficult areas in the relations
between the attorney, his client, and the government. There is no question
that the lawyer should be paid for the time and efforts he expends on the govern-
ment's behalf. This is his stock-in-trade and he should not be forced to give it
away; nor should the injured party have to bear the burden of the cost of col-
lection of the government's claim. The government receives the benefit; the
government should pay the costs. Steps should be taken now by the govern-
ment to either pay the attorneys for their services or discontinue the use of
private counsel.
The latter course may be the more desirable in the long run for a number
of reasons; but a quick examination of the number of cases currently handled
by private attorneys and the present workload of the existing agency and Depart-
ment of Justice staffs will reveal that such a course is impossible without an
enormous, overnight staff expansion. Since such staff expansion is not currently
practical, efforts must be made to pay private counsel for his work. As outlined
above,3 3 this may not be as difficult as the agencies claim and may only require
the reversal of an ill-considered government interpretation of section 3106.
C. Representation by Private Counsel
The specific language of section 3106 clearly indicates that a private at-
torney cannot represent the government's claim in an action where the United
States was a named party.3 4 But the language of this section does not necessarily
prevent the inclusion of the government's claim by use of an allegation in the
injured party's complaint." Two authors who have written about this problem,
231 Air Force Manual 112-1, Annotations to 1 15-14(e) (Oct. 29, 1969).
232 See note 196, supra.
233 See text accompanying notes 209-14, supra.
234 For the text of this section, see note 181, supra.
235 The suggested allegation reads:
As a result of said injuries the plaintiff has received (and in the future will receive)
medical and hospital care and treatment furnished by the United States of America.
The plaintiff, for the sole use and benefit of the United States of America under the
provisions of 42 United States Code 2651-2653, and with its express consent, asserts
a claim for the reasonable value of said (past and future) care and treatment. Air
Force Manual 112-1, 1 15-14(d) (1969).
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Cassady and Noone, disagree.s 6 The disagreement centers around -two points:
the first is whether the language of section 3106 prevents any trial representation
at all by a private attorney; the second is whether the United States is a real
party in interest, thus requiring that it be named in the suit in order to be able to
recover.
Cassady takes the position that the use of the word "employ" is the key to
the meaning of section 3106."7 He argues that "employ" means more than
merely paying counsel. It means use.23 8 It is possible to employ or use a counsel
in a broad sense without promising to pay him anything. He therefore concludes
that section 3106 prohibits the use of any attorney outside the Attorney Gen-
eral's office. There is some logic to this interpretation. The argument for its
use here, however, seems to break down when the agency practice of hiring
full-time, staff counsel is considered. Cassady fully recognizes this practice and
merely treats it as an exception.
2 39
Noone, on the other hand, claims that section 3106 has nothing to do with
representation but is merely "intended to prevent the obligation of Government
funds for attorney's fees ... "2"0 In this contention he is supported by United
States v. Denton.241 There, the court, speaking of this prohibition, said that
"History shows that such requirements were a result of duplication of expenditure
by the government in prosecution of causes and defense of claims." 2
The problem with both approaches is that they fail to consider the whole
problem. Cassady is right that the word "employ" has a broader meaning than
merely a prohibition against payment for services performed. He fails, however,
to consider the statute in its entirety, which prohibits the employment only "for
the conduct of litigation in which the United States, an agency, or an employee
thereof is a party, or is interested .... ",' He does not attempt to answer the
difficult question whether the inclusion of the government's claim in the injured
party's complaint makes the suit "litigation in which the United States . . . is
interested." 2'4
Noone does not consider this problem either; he seems to tacitly accept
that such inclusion would fall within the prohibition. He attempts to avoid its
application by showing that it applies only to compensation.2 5 In doing so, he
fails to consider the entire legislative history of the section. It was originally
the Act of June 22, 1870,248 which created the Department of Justice. Noone
and the Denton Court are quite correct in saying that one of the reasons for
creating the Department of Justice and giving it responsibility for handling all
litigation was to prevent the hiring of private counsel when the government had
236 Noone at 20; Cassady at 31.
237 See Cassady, at 19.
238 Id. at 20.
239 Id. at 4, n.11.
240 See, Noone, at 21.
241 307 F.2d 336 (6th Cir. 1962), cert. denied 371 U.S. 923 (1962).
242 Id. at 338.
243 5 U.S.C. § 3106 (Supp. III, 1968).
244 Id. As has already been seen, he does not need to consider this point because he
maintains that the government cannot legally use private attorneys at any stage of the recovery
program.
245 Cf. Noone at 10.
246 Ch. 150, 16 Stat. 162. See United States v. Crosthwaite, 168 U.S. 375 (1897).
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full-time employees who could handle the cases. This was not the only purpose,
however, in establishing the Department and charging it with this duty. Equally
important were providing a uniform interpretation of the various statutes through-
out the government agencies and development of a consistent position in govern-
ment litigation.247 The need for such consistency under the Act is indicated by the
provision in all the agency regulations that all cases involving a new point of
laiw will be referred to the Department of Justice.248 Noone's analysis, therefore,
is not convincing.
The problem remains as to whether or not this inclusion of the government
claim in the injured party's suit makes the suit "litigation in which the United
States is interested."2 9 There has been no direct answer to this question; there is,
however, some indication that it may be severable when one considers the argu-
ments surrounding the second point of controversy - whether the United States
is, in fact, a real party in interest."'
Cassady maintains that since the right of recovery under the Act is an
independent right or cause of action,"' the United States is a real party in interest
and as such must be a named party in the suit.252 Bernzweig255 agrees that the
United States is a real party in interest, but points out that the United States
cannot be forced to intervene under a state "real party in interest" statute.2"
Where the government chooses to attempt to assert its rights in a state court
through the inclusion of an allegation255 in the injured party's complaint, the
state court should, if Cassady is right, have the right to strike the allegation
since the government is an indispensable party.250 This would force the United
States either to join as a named party or seek enforcement of its right elsewhere.25
Noone, the Department of Justice5 " and the Air Force25" say no260 They
claim that the Act26' establishes the government's right as one of subrogation;
therefore, the normal subrogation rules apply. In most states,202 a subrogee or
assignor can bring suit for the entire claim in his own name,0 ' and the final
247 This intent is further evidenced by 28 U.S.C. § 516 (Supp. II, 1966) which reserves
representation or conduct of litigation to the Department of Justice.
248 See, e.g., Army Reg. 27-38, 4-5(d) (Jan. 15, 1969).
249 See text accompanying note 234, supra.
250 See text following note 239, supra.
251 See Cassady at 31-32; See also note 196, supra.
252 FED. R. Civ. P. 18. See also Louisiana v. Texas Co., 38 F.Supp. 860 (E.D. La. 1941)
holds that a state is the real party in interest when the relief sought inures to its benefit alone
and if a judgment for the plaintiff will effectively operate in the state's favor.
253 Bernzweig, Public Law 87-693: An Analysis and Interpretation of the Federal Medical
Care Recovery Act, 64 COLU . L. Rv. 1257, 1270 n.82 (1964).
254 Citing United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584 (1941).
255 See note 235, supra.
256 McWhirter v. Otis Elevator Co., 40 F. Supp. 11 (W.D. S.C. 1941) holds that a de-
fendant has the right to be sued by the real party in interest so that the judgment will fully
protect him against further suits.
257 The United States can always enforce its rights by independent suit in the federal courts.
258 U.S. Dep't of Justice Memo, Suggested Procedures for Collection of Claims For Value
of Medical Care (Sept. 1, 1964), on file with the NOTRE DAME LAWYER.
259 AFJAG REPTR. 29, item IB (1964).
260 Noone at 20.
261 42 U.S.C. § 2651(b) '(1964).
262. Annot., 157 A.L.R. 1242 (.1945). Noone at 21-27 brings this annotation down to date.
263 In those states which do not recognize the collateral source rule or require the subrogee
to sue separately in his own name, this theory will not work. Louisiana is such a state. See
note 267, infra.
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division of the judgment is a matter of no concern to the defendant.2" Under
this latter' theory, recovery has been had in many cases brought by private
counsel where the question of the propriety of the practice has not been, ex-
amined
2 5
The courts are about evenly divided over whether the United States, is a
real party in interest or whether the government can enforce its -rights by sub-
rogation. 'The question was first raised in 1965 in Smith v. Foucha.2" In
that case the government's claim was dismissed on appeal. The court held that
the government's claim was a subrogated claim and that under Louisiana law2..
the subrogee must sue in his own right to recover his interest. "",
The problem again arose in 1968. Early in the year, the Chief of the Justice
Department's Civil Division informed the various agencies29 that three of the
District of Columbia district court judges had held that private lawyers could
not represent the government's interest and that the United States Attorney
would have to intervene. Apparently this was an informal opinion, rendered in
chambers, and the basis of the holding is not available. °
This problem was recently considered by a New York court in Carrington
v. Vanlander.271 Here the plaintiff's attorney wanted to amend the-complaint
to include the government's claim. The court denied the motion to amend, saying
that the government could intervene as a party, but under the New -York
statute272 could not sue the defendant in the guise of an amendment to the
plaintiff's petition.
By way of contrast, three other recent cases, Conley v. Maatala,7
Kaplan v. Bella,27"4 and Marshall v. Cuttrell,7 5 refused to-dismiss the plaintiff's
allegations incorporating the government's claim. In all three cases, the govern-
ment had furnished the private attorney with a letter authorizing him to include
the allegation in the injured party's suit and agreeing that the government would
264 See Hughes v. Sanders, 287 F. Supp. 332 (E.D. Okla. 1968), where a judgment was
rendered against the defendant and the government later waived its claim. Upon learning this,
the defendant petitioned to have the judgment reduced by the amount of the government's
claim. The court refused to reduce the judgment on the basis that this was a matter of grace
granted by the sovereign. Id. at 334.
265 Id. Earlier, another district court had said, in United States v. Bartholomew, 266 F.
Supp. 213 (W.D. Okla. 1967), that the plaintiff must have incurred the expenses before he
could bring suit under Oklahoma law. In other words, Oklahoma would not recognize the
collateral source -rule.
266 172 So.2d 318 (La. App. 1965). See also, Avery v. Smith, 216 So.2d 111, 114 (La.
App. 1968).
267 2 LA. CIV. CODE art. 697 (West 1960).
268 A later case, Irby v. Government Employees Ins. Co., 175 So.2d 9, 11 (La. App. 1965),
quoted in part in note 224, supra, recognizes the right of a private attorney to represent the
government in negotiations leading to a settlement.
269 The copy of the letter addressed to the Judge Advocate General of the Navy is re-
printed in full in Cassady, at 34 n.56.
270 A personal interview between the author and members of the Department of Justice
revealed that the present practice is for the United States Attorney to have one of his assistants
appear, but the case is handled completely by the private attorney.
271 58 Misc.2d 80, 294 N.Y,S.2d 412 (Sup. Ct., Oswego Ct., 1968).
272 N.Y. Civ. PRAc. § 1004 (McKinney 1963). This statute indicates that joinder is un-
necessary where an insured has given the insurance company a subrogation agreement. The
insured can sue for the entire claim.
273 303 F. Supp. 484 (D. N.H. 1969). -
274 Civil No. 68-229 (W.D. Tex. May 26, 1969).
275 Civil No. 70-254 (W.D. Okla., Aug. 4, 1970).
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be bound by the outcome of the suit. None of the three cases discusses the
question in detail, but Conley is clearly pitched on the right of the subrogor to
recover the entire claim.
Since all of these decisions are subject to possible appeal, and since all
placed the government's argument in its most favorable light, it cannot be said
that the problem is finally resolved; it would, however, seem that both Noone and
Cassady are right in their analysis. A careful reading of the first section of the
Act will reveal that the government is granted an independent right;276 but to
enforce that right, the government is further subrogated to any rights of the
injured party.2 " It would thus appear that the government can choose the
method by which it will enforce its rights. If it chooses to enforce the right as
an independent cause of action, then the Cassady analysis seems correct and the
United States should not be able to enforce its rights through the suit of the
private attorney 75 On the other hand, the government could select to enforce
its rights on a subrogated basis, in which case the Noone theory would seem
proper. If, however, the government chooses this method, it should also suffer
any other consequences of subrogation - such as having its suit barred by de-
fenses which are good against the plaintiff but which would not have applied to
the government if it had chosen to enforce its independent right by intervention
or separate suit."79
D. Ethical Problems
The last problem which merits passing consideration is that of the ethical
considerations arising when the practicing lawyer attempts to represent both the
government's interest and that of the injured party. Because of the contact
letter,"' there is little question that an attorney-client relationship is created
when the injured party's attorney agrees to protect the government's claim.281
Certainly, the lack of a fee paid by the government will not preclude what would
otherwise be such a relationship.
276 42 U.S.C. § 2651(a) (1954). That section provides:
In any case in which the United States is authorized or required by law to furnish
hospital, medical, surgical, or dental care and treatment . . . to a person who is
injured . . . under circumstances creating a tort liability upon some third person
. . . to pay damages therefore, the United States shall have a right to recover . . .
the reasonable value of care and treatment so furnished or to be furnished and shall,
as to this right be subrogated to any right or claim that the injured . . . person . . .
has ....
277 Does this mean that the injured party cannot sue for these costs under the collateral
source rule? The defendant, in Kaplin v. Bella, Civil No. 68-229-SA (W.D. Tex., May 26,
1969), thought so. See Defendant's Memorandum Brief for Partial Summary Judgment, Kaplin
v. Bella, supra, at 2-3, on file with the NoTmR DAME LAWYER. This question is also discussed in
note 50, supra. -
278 It is conceivable that an argument can be made that the practice of including the sug-
gested allegation is supported by the language of 42 U.S.C. § 2651(b) which authorizes the
United States to sue either in its own name or in the name of the injured party.
279 For a general discussion of the government as a subrogee under the Act, see Turner,
Hospital Claims; 42 U.S.C. 2651: The United States as Subrogee 12 AF JAG L. Rav. 44
(1970).
280 See note 174, supra.
281 The existence of this relationship was confirmed in Irby v. Government Employees Ins.
Co., 175 So.2d 9 (La. App. 1965).
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The ethical problems that private counsel faces here are very similar to
those with which he must contend when he attempts to represent both a tort-
feasor and his insurance company.. There will definitely be some times when
the interest of his two clients will- conflict. For example, in most cases it is to
the advantage of the government to reach a quick settlement283 since its damages
are readily ascertainable and not open to much question.8 On the other hand,
the injured party's case may not lend itself to early settlement. Should the lawyer
recommend acceptance of an early settlement or the extended delay that a
trial will bring? Either does not do justice to one of his clients.
The conflict becomes most obvious and potentially dangerous when the
attorney attempts to apportion the proceeds of a proposed settlement offer or
judgment between the government's claim and that of the injured party. It can
be argued with some validity that the attorney's obligation to the government
ceases when the settlement or judgment is received, and that he becomes solely
an advocate for the injured party's interest with the government claims personnel.
It is, however, unrealistic to say that the final distribution of the settlement or
judgment is not one of the major factors in the mind of the lawyer when he con-
ducts his negotiations or presents the case in court. Often the ethical problems
are further complicated by the fact that it is to his financial interest to favor
the injured party over the government since the government pays him no fee.
Presently, there are no clear-cut answers to this dilemma. The profession
is just beginning to consider whether the general guidelines it has developed in
the form of the Code of Professional Ethics 5 should prevent the lawyer rep-
resenting both the insurance company and its policy-holder. Until some definite
282 For a recent discussion of this problem in the case of injured parties and uninsured
motorist insurance carriers, see Walsh. Subrogation Under Uninsured Motorist Insurance, 10
B.C. IND. & Com. L. REv. 77, 97 (1968).
283 It was the whole purpose of the Act to provide a system for quick administrative collec-
tions which would not involve frequent litigation. See, Letter from John M. Sprague, Deputy
Assistant Secretary of Defense, to William A. Newman, Jr., Director, Defense Accounting and
Auditing Division, General Accounting Office, Feb. 26, 1960, reproduced in the appendix to
COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES, REVIEW OF THE GOVERNMENT'S- RIGTS
AND PRACTICES CONCERNING RECOVERY OF THE COST Op HOSPITAL AND MEDICAL SERVICES
IN NEGLIGENT THIRD-PARTY CASES at 21 '(1960).
284 Philips v. Trame, 252 F. Supp. 948 (E.D. Ill. 1966) holds that the rates established by
the Bureau of the Budget are not subject to attack. Under 42 U.S.C. § 2652(a) (1964) the
President may establish appropriate rates. He has in turn delegated this authority to the
Bureau of the Budget. Exec. Order No. 11060, 3 C.F.R. 260 (Supp. 1962). Presidential Orders
prescribing regulations under federal statutes are to be treated as if they were a part of the
statute. Mitchell v. Flintkote Co., 185 F.2d 1008 (2d Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 931
'(1951). Currently the rate is $53 per in-patient day. 34 Fed. Reg. 14252 (1969). However,
the medical necessity for the hospitalization can be challenged. Murphy v. Smith, 243 F. Supp.
1006 (E.D. S.C. 1965) and Tolliver v. Shumate, 150 S.E.2d 579 (W. Va. 1966). Address by
Edward S. Ring, Vice President, Government Employees Insurance Company, to 30th Annual
NAIIA Convention, Portland, Oregon, May, 1967, on file with the NOTRE DAME LAWYER,
suggests that most military hospitals divide their patients into five categories: Class I, authorized
to go on pass at any time; Class II, authorized to go on pass on Wednesdays and week-
ends only; Class III, ward patient authorized to work and walk around the hospital, but not
to go on pass; Class IV, bed patient with bathroom privileges; Class V, strict bed patients. He
argues that by civilian hospital standards Classes I and II would not be hospitalized and those
in Classes III and IV are subject to question.




answer is formulated to that analogous problem, it will be up to each individual
attorney to decide for himself whether he can ethically represent both the govern-
ment and the injured party. The problem is, however, one which he should
consider before rushing headlong into a relationship with the government. 88
E. Advantages to the Lawyer
Up to this point, the focus has been on the problems which the practicing
attorney must contend with when he agrees to handle the government's claim.
Even with these problems, in over seventy percent of the cases under the Act,
private counsel has agreed to accept the additional burden of protecting the
government's claim. Since the government does not pay a fee, there must be
some benefit which will accrue to counsel. The main benefits the government
offers are set out in the original contact letter to the attorney." 7 Basically the
government agrees to: (1) give counsel complete control over the handling of
the case28 and (2) to furnish all medical records in its possession and, where
possible, make available medical personnel to appear in court.8 9
There are a number of advantages that the practicing attorney receives by
having complete control over both the government's claim and that of the in-
jured party. This means that the tortfeasor and his insurance company deal with
only one person. Further, the lawyer can control the release of information
to the tortfeasor and the direction of the negotiations. At the same time, it prevents
the tortfeasor from exploiting any difference of opinion as to whether to accept
any particular settlement offer. If the case goes to trial, the injured party's
attorney will be able to develop his case as a whole without interference from the
United States Attorney and without suffering the prejudice in the eyes of the
jury that might result if the United States was a party plaintiff.
As important as this right to control the government's claim and to be free
of interference is, it is probably overshadowed by the promise to make medical
records29 0 and government medical personnel available to testify without fee.2 '
The main advantage is that the government places no restrictions on the use of
the medical witnesses. They will obviously testify to support the government's
286 The injured party should also be informed and given the chance of objecting to his
attorney representing the government.
287 See note 174, supra.
288 It is possible to get the government to agree to a percentage settlement of the final
recovery prior to negotiation. Cf. Air Force Manual 112-1, % 15-18(e) (Oct. 29, 1969).
289 When the personnel who rendered the treatment have been transferred to remote duty
stations or have been discharged, the government cannot make these witnesses available.
290 See Cassady at 43. He maintains that the government medical records are subject to
subpoena duces tecum. This question is not as free from doubt as Gassady would have one
believe. The services have extensive regulations concerning the handling of the receipt of such
subpoenas and what actions will be taken. In the area of the Recovery Act, the Attorney Gen-
eral's regulations, 28 C.F.R. § 43.2(b) (1969), promulgated to implement the Act, specifically
authorizes the withholding of such records for non-cooperation by the injured party. Whether
the federal supremacy clause would protect records withheld under-this regulation from- dis-
closure under an order by a state court is an unanswered question.
291 Cassady at 43 also indicates that many private attorneys misunderstand and think that
the government will foot the bill for civilian medical experts.
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clsim, but can also be used as the injured party's star witness as to the nature,
treatment, and extent of the injured party's injuries. 92
This promise has been a mixed blessing at best. If there is any one over-
whelming criticism of the government's recovery program by the practicing
attorneys, it is that the government has failed to live up to-its promise to furnish
these witnesses.29 Problems in this area have led the Army to, discontinue the
offer of medical witnesses in its initial coitact letter.294 The other agencies which
have continued to offer this inducement vary as to what they mean by making
medical witnesses available. The Air Force has taken the broadest position and
will send the attending physician on a temporary duty at government expense
to a trial that is within a reasonable distance of his duty station.2"' The Depart-
ment of Justice has taken the unofficial position that the government's obliga-
tion extends no further than providing some medical personnel - not necessarily
the attending doctor - to testify based upon the medical records (with no
examination of the injured party) that the treatment rendered was appropriate
and necessary for injuries incurred. Further, it maintains that even this limited
witness service does not have to be furnished unless there is an installation con-
venient to the place of trial where such personnel are assigned.'9
VII. Conclusion
In spite of the various problems in both the official and unofficial recovery
programs outlined above, the system continues to work and the number and
amount of the recoveries have grown steadily each year.29 ' Likewise, private
attorneys continue to represent the government in a large majority of the cases.
It is hoped that the foregoing discussion will furnish the practicing lawyer
with a basic understanding of the government's operations under the Federal
Medical Care Recovery Act. As is the case with all things new, there has been
a tendency upon the part of many lawyers to ignore the Act. The increased ef-
fectiveness of the government's enforcement program, however, has made such
an attitude one of professional irresponsibility. No longer can the attorney dis-
292 Noone at 13 reports that three Air Force doctors and one therapist helped an injured
party recover $87,500 while the government recouped $13,000. In another case, the injured
pilot recovered $110,000 and the government $6,000 on the basis of government medical
testimony.
293 Cassady at 43.
294 Letter, JAGL-T 1967, Administration of Affirmative Tort Claims '(A.R.'s 27-37 and
27-38), (Nov. 2, 1967), on file with the NOTRE DAME LAWYER.
295 Air Force Manual 112-1, 1 15-23(d) (Oct. 29, 1969). Requests for these witnesses
must be cleared through the Judge Advocate General in Washington if it involves temporary
duty or travel. Id. Noone, note 268, supra, reports that the longest trip to date was from
Keesler AFB, Miss., to Anchorage, Alaska. Quite obviously there is the problem that the treat-
ing physician has been transferred to a point halfway around the world or has been discharged
from the service. In these cases the Air Force cannot make the personnel available.
296 Personal interview between the author and various Department personnel.
297 For example, Department of Justice figures show the growth in the amount of recov-
eries in 1967 over 1966 to be 14.3% and in 1968 to be 18.6%. The total number of claims
asserted increased by 1,475 in 1968 while the number of recoveries increased by 1,777. Through
December, 1969, the total government-wide collections since the beginning of the program
amounted to $26,015,377.23.
[Vol. 46: 253]
294 NOTRE DAME LAWYER [Winter, 1971]
regard the government's interest and claim to be furnishing his client complete
and competent legal representation. To do so would be analogous to advising
a corporate client on a complicated financial arrangement without considering
its income tax consequences.
While the bureaucratic maze exists in the administration of the Act, the
discussion of the various agency procedures hopefully provides some familiarity
for the average practitioner. It should be apparent to all that for the recovery
system to work to the best advantage of both the government and the injured
party, there must be a good working relationship between the active bar and
the enforcement agencies. Such a relationship can only be built upon a mutual
understanding of each other's problems and limitations.
